Copyright © 1999 NFPA, All Rights
Reserved
This edition of NFPA 1670, Standard
on Operations and Training for Technical Rescue Incidents, was prepared by
the Technical Committee on Technical Rescue and acted on by the National Fire
Protection Association, Inc., at its Fall Meeting held November 16-18, 1998, in
Atlanta, GA. It was issued by the Standards Council on January 15, 1999, with
an effective date of February 4, 1999.
This edition of NFPA 1670 was approved
as an American National Standard on February 4, 1999.
Origin and Development of NFPA
1670
This is the first edition of this
document. The responsibility for NFPA 1470, Standard on Search and Rescue
Training for Structural Collapse Incidents, 1994 edition, was transferred
to the Technical Committee on Technical Rescue, which has prepared a proposed
new NFPA 1670, Standard on Operations and Training for Technical Rescue
Incidents. This document incorporates the scope of NFPA 1470, which has
been expanded to include identifying and establishing levels of functional
capability for safety and effectively conducting operations at technical rescue
incidents.
Technical Committee on
Technical Rescue
Leslie D.
English, Chair
MacMillan Bloedel Packaging Inc., AL [U]
Donald C.
Cooper, Secretary
City of Cuyahoga Falls Fire Dept., OH [U]
Rep. Emergency Response Inst.
Joseph C.
Burris, North Carolina Dept. of
Insurance, NC [E]
Hugh
Connor, Orem Fire Dept., UT [U]
Rep. Utah Fire and Rescue Academy
I. David
Daniels, Seattle Fire Dept., WA [E]
James R.
Engram, Colorado Springs Fire Dept., CO
[U]
Steve
Fleming, Poudre Fire Authority, CO [U]
James A.
Frank, CMC Rescue, Inc., CA [M]
Tim
Gallagher, Phoenix Fire Dept., AZ [U]
Carl
Goodson, Fire Protection Publications,
OK [M]
Billie
Hall, Washington Township Fire Dept.,
OH [C]
Ihor M.
Holowczynsky, Rescue Tech, Inc., MB,
Canada [SE]
George G.
Howard, Nassau County Fire Academy, NY
[SE]
Steve
Hudson, Pigeon Mountain Industries,
Inc., GA [M]
Jerry S.
Koenig, Falcon Air Force Base Fire
Dept., CO [E]
Billy M.
Lee, Jr., Champion Int’l Paper Co., FL
[U]
Mike
McGroarty, City of La Habra Fire Dept.,
CA [E]
Christopher
J. Naum, L. A. Emergency Mgmt. &
Training, NY [SE]
John P.
O’Connell, Collapse Rescue Systems
Inc., NY [SE]
Michael T.
Reimer, South Technical Education
Center, FL [RT]
Robert E.
Rhea, Fairfax County Fire & Rescue,
VA [U]
Michael R.
Roop, Roco Rescue, Inc., LA [M]
Brian E.
Rousseau, New York State Office of Fire
Prevention & Control, NY [E]
Chase N.
Sargent, Virginia Beach Fire Dept., VA
[E]
Robert P.
Thornton, City of Mobile Fire Dept., AL
[U]
Rep. University of South Alabama (CERT)
William J.
Troup, U.S. Fire Administration, MD
[SE]
William H.
Weems, Safe State Program, AL [SE]
Ernest
(Richey) Wright, PMI-Petzl
Distribution, Inc., FL [M]
Alternates
Michael G.
Brown, Virginia Beach Fire Dept., VA
[U]
(Alt. to C. N. Sargent)
Fred J.
Jackson, City of Cuyahoga Falls Fire
Dept., OH [U]
(Alt. to D. C. Cooper)
John F.
McCallum, Jr., Chicago Fire Dept., IL
[U]
(Alt. to R. P. Thornton)
Frank
Florence,
NFPA Staff Liaison
This list represents the
membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition.
Since that time, changes in the membership may have occurred. A key to
classifications is found at the back of this document.
NOTE: Membership on a
committee shall not in and of itself constitute an endorsement of the
Association or any document developed by the committee on which the member
serves.
Committee Scope: This Committee shall
have primary responsibility for documents on technical rescue techniques,
operations, and procedures to develop efficient, proper, and safe utilization
of personnel and equipment.
NFPA 1670
Standard on Operations and Training
for Technical Rescue Incidents
1999 Edition
NOTICE: An asterisk (*) following the
number or letter designating a paragraph indicates that explanatory material on
the paragraph can be found in Appendix A.
Information on referenced publications can be
found in Chapter 10 and Appendix C.
This standard identifies and
establishes levels of functional capability for safely and effectively conducting
operations at technical rescue incidents.
The requirements of this standard apply
to organizations that provide response to technical rescue incidents.
The purpose of this standard is to
assist the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) in assessing a technical rescue
hazard within the response area, to identify the level of operational
capability, and to establish operational criteria. The functional capabilities
of this standard shall be permitted to be achieved in a variety of ways.
Abrasion.
The damaging effect on rope and other equipment caused by friction-like
movement.
Acceptable Entry Conditions. Conditions in a space that must exist to allow entry and
to ensure that employees can safely enter into and work within the space.
Accepted Engineering Practices. Those requirements that are compatible with standards of
practice required by a registered professional engineer.
Alternate Air System. A secondary air supply system that involves an alternate
second-stage regulator provided by either a separate dedicated second-stage or
a multipurpose second-stage regulator coupled with a buoyancy compensator
inflator valve.
Aluminum Hydraulic Shoring. Pre-engineered shoring system comprised of aluminum
hydraulic cylinders (crossbraces) used in conjunction with vertical rails
(uprights) or horizontal rails (walers) and designed specifically to support
the sidewalls of an excavation and prevent cave-ins.
Anchor Point. A single, structural component used either alone or in
combination with other components to create an anchor system capable of
sustaining the actual and potential load on the rope rescue system.
Anchor System. One or more anchor points rigged in such a way as to
provide a structurally significant connection point for rope rescue system
components.
Angle of Repose. The greatest angle above the horizontal plane at which
loose material (such as soil) will lie without sliding.
Approach Assessment. The period of time from the moment when the incident site
first becomes visible to the moment when the initial size-up is completed.
Approved.*
Acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction.
Ascending (Line). A means of safely traveling up a fixed line with the use
of one or more ascent devices.
Ascent Device. An auxiliary equipment system component that is a friction
or mechanical device utilized alone or in combination with other mechanical
devices to allow ascending a fixed rope.
Assessment Phase (Size-Up). The process of assessing the conditions, the scene, and
the subject’s condition and ability to assist in his or her own rescue.
Attendant.*
A term used to describe U.S. federally regulated industrial workers who are
qualified to be stationed outside one or more confined spaces, who monitor
authorized entrants, and who perform all of the following duties:
(a) Remain
outside the confined space during entry operations until relieved by another
attendant
(b) Summon
rescue and other needed resources as soon as the attendant determines that
authorized entrants might need assistance to escape from confined space hazards
(c) Perform
nonentry rescues as specified by the rescue procedure listed on the permit (see
Entry Permit)
Authority Having Jurisdiction.* The organization, office, or individual responsible for
approving equipment, an installation, or a procedure.
Authorized Entrant.* A term used to describe U.S. federally regulated
industrial workers who are designated to enter confined spaces and who meet the
following training requirements for each specific space they enter:
(a) Hazard
Recognition. The ability to recognize the signs and symptoms of exposure to
a hazardous material or atmosphere within the space and to understand the
consequences of exposure and the mode of transmission (i.e., injection,
ingestion, inhalation, or absorption) for the hazard.
(b) Communications.
The ability to carry out the method by which rescue services are to be summoned
in the event of an emergency, the method by which the entrant will communicate
with the attendant on the outside of the space, and a backup method of
communication should the primary system fail.
(c) *
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
The ability to use all PPE appropriate for the confined space.
(d) *
Self-Rescue. The ability to carry
out the method by which the entrant will escape from the space should an
emergency occur.
Auxiliary Rope Rescue Equipment. System components, other than life-safety rope and
harnesses, that are load-bearing accessories — including, but not limited to,
ascending devices, carabiners, descent control devices, rope grab devices, and
snap-links — designed to be utilized for rescue.
Avalanche.*
A mass of snow — sometimes containing ice, water, and debris — that slides down
a mountainside.
Belay.*
The method by which a potential fall distance is controlled to minimize damage
to equipment and/or injury to a live load.
Bell-Bottom Pier Hole. A type of shaft or footing excavation, the bottom of which
is made larger than the cross section above to form a bell shape.
Benching or Benching System. A method of protecting employees from cave-ins by
excavating the side of an excavation to form one or a series of horizontal
levels or steps, usually with vertical or near-vertical surfaces between
levels.
Bend. A
knot that joins two ropes or webbing pieces together.
Bight.
The open loop in a rope or piece of webbing formed when it is doubled back on
itself.
Blanking and Blinding. A form of hydraulic energy isolation that is the absolute
closure of a pipe, line, or duct by fastening a solid plate (such as a
spectacle blind or skillet blind) that completely covers the bore and that is
capable of withstanding the maximum pressure within the pipe, line, or duct
with no leakage beyond the plate.
Body/Property Recovery. An operation involving the retrieval of either the remains
of a deceased victim or property, but in no case a living person.
Cave-In.
The separation of a mass of soil or rock material from the side of an
excavation or trench, or the loss of soil from under a trench shield or support
system, and its sudden movement into the excavation, either by falling or
sliding, in sufficient quantity so that it could entrap, bury, or otherwise
injure and immobilize a person.
Collapse Zone. See Rescue Area.
Compass.
A device that uses the earth’s magnetic field to indicate relative direction.
Competent Person. One who is capable of identifying existing and predictable
conditions in the surroundings or in the working area that are unsanitary,
hazardous, or dangerous to employees, and who has authorization to take prompt
corrective measures to eliminate such conditions.
Compound Rope Mechanical Advantage System. A combination of individual rope mechanical advantage
systems created by stacking the load end of one rope mechanical advantage
system onto the haul line of another or others to multiply the forces created
by the individual system(s).
Confined Space.* A space that has the following characteristics:
(a) Is
large enough and so configured that a person can enter and perform assigned
work
(b) Has
limited or restricted means for entry or exit (e.g., tanks, vessels, silos,
storage bins, hoppers, vaults, and pits)
(c) Is
not designed for continuous human occupancy
(d) Has
one or more of the following characteristics:
1. Contains or has a potential to contain a hazardous atmosphere
2. Contains a material that has the potential for engulfing an
entrant
3. Has an internal configuration such that an entrant could be
trapped or asphyxiated by inwardly converging walls or by a floor that slopes
downward and tapers to a smaller cross section
4. Contains any other recognized serious safety or health hazards
(including fall, environmental, and equipment hazards)
Confined Space Entry. Ensuing work activities in a confined space. Confined
space entry is considered to have occurred as soon as any part of the entrant’s
body breaks the plane of an opening into the space.
Confined Space Rescue Equipment. The equipment (including life safety rope, Class III
harnesses, manually operated lowering and lifting devices, anchoring systems,
and other adjunct rescue equipment as appropriate) used for entry-type rescue
of persons from confined spaces.
Confined Space Rescue Team.* A combination of individuals (a minimum of six for
organizations operating at the technician level and a minimum of four for
organizations operating at the operations level) trained, equipped, and
available to respond to confined space emergencies. This team shall be trained
to one of three proficiency levels: awareness, operational, or technical. A
rescue team shall be required to meet the operational or technical levels to
qualify as a rescue service dependent upon the type and complexity of the
confined space emergency.
Confined Space Retrieval Equipment. See Retrieval Equipment.
Counter Balance. A raising system utilizing a 1:1 mechanical advantage and
a weighted object (human or otherwise) to reduce the need for additional force
to lift the load.
Cribbing.*
Short lengths of robust, usually hardwood, timber, 4 4 inches and 18 to 24 inches long, that are
used in a variety of ways, usually in the stabilization of vehicles.
Critical Angle. An angle of 120 degrees or less created between two rope
rescue system components wide enough so as to create excessive force on the
anchor points to which they are attached.
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing
(CISD). See NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire
Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, A-10-1.2.
Cross Braces (or Struts). The individual horizontal members of a shoring system
installed perpendicular to the sides of the excavation, the ends of which bear
against either uprights or wales. (See also Shoring.)
Descending (Line). A means of safely traveling down a fixed line using a
descent control device.
Descent Control Device. A rope rescue system component that is a friction or
mechanical device utilized with rope to control descent.
Disentanglement. The cutting of a vehicle and/or machinery away from
trapped or injured victims.
Dive. An
exposure to increased pressure whether underwater or in a hyperbaric chamber.
Dive Operation. A situation requiring divers to complete an assigned task.
Dive Team.
An organization of public safety divers and members in training.
Diver. An
individual using breathing apparatus that supplies compressed breathing gas at
the ambient pressure.
Edge Protection. A means of protecting software components within a rope
rescue system from the potentially harmful effects of exposed sharp or abrasive
edges.
Emergency Incident. A specific emergency operation.
Emergency Medical Service (EMS). The organization(s) responsible for the care and transport
of sick and injured persons to an appropriate emergency care facility. Referred
to as Emergency Services in U.S. federal confined space regulations.
Engulfment.
The surrounding and effective capture of a person by a fluid (e.g., liquid,
finely divided particulate) substance that can be aspirated to cause death by
filling or plugging the respiratory system or that can exert enough force on
the body to cause death by strangulation, constriction, or crushing.
Entry.
The action by which a person passes into a confined space. Entry includes
ensuing work or rescue activities in that environment and is considered to have
occurred as soon as any part of the entrant’s body breaks the plane of an
opening into the space, trench, or excavation.
Entry Permit.* A written or printed document, established by an employer,
for nonrescue entry into confined spaces.
Entry Team.
The group of individuals, with established communications and leadership,
assigned to perform work or rescue activities beyond the opening of, and
within, the space, trench, or excavation.
Environment.* A collection of characteristics such as weather, altitude,
and terrain contained in an area that are unique to a location.
Excavation.
Any man-made cut, cavity, trench, or depression in an earth surface, formed by
the removal of earth.
Extrication. The removal of trapped victims from a vehicle or machinery.
Face(s).
The vertical or inclined earth surface formed as a result of excavation work.
Failure.
The breakage, displacement, or permanent deformation of a structural member or
connection so as to reduce its structural integrity and its supportive
capabilities.
Federal Response Plan.* The Federal Response Plan (for Public Law 93-288, as
amended) describes the basic mechanisms and structures by which the federal
government will mobilize resources and conduct activities to augment state and
local disaster and emergency response efforts.
FEMA Task Force Search and Rescue Marking
System.* Distinct markings made with
international orange spray paint near a collapsed structure’s most accessible
point of entry.
FEMA Task Force Structure/Hazard
Evaluation Marking System.* Distinct markings
made with international orange spray paint, after performing a building hazard
assessment, near a collapsed structure’s most accessible point of entry.
FEMA Task Force Structure Marking System,
Structure Identification Within a Geographic Area.* Distinct markings made with international orange spray
paint to label buildings with their street number so that personnel can differentiate
one building from another.
Fixed Line (Fixed Line System). A rope rescue system consisting of a nonmoving rope
attached to an anchor system.
Flammable.*
A combustible that is capable of being easily ignited and rapidly consumed by
fire.
Flammable Liquid. Any liquid having a flash point below 100°F (37.8°C) and
having a vapor pressure not exceeding 40 psi (276 kPa) (absolute) at 100°F
(37.8°C).
General Area (or Warm Zone).* An area surrounding the incident site (e.g., collapsed
structure or trench) whose size is proportional to the size and nature of the
incident. Within the general area, access by people, heavy machinery, and
vehicles is limited and strictly controlled.
Grade Pole.
A wood or fiberglass pole, either cut to a certain length or provided with
markings, used by workers when setting pipes on grade.
Hardware.
A rigid mechanical auxiliary rope rescue component that can include, but is not
limited to, anchor plates, carabiners, and mechanical ascent and descent
control devices.
Harness.
See Life Safety Harness.
Hazard Analysis. The process of identifying situations or conditions that
have the potential to cause injury to people, damage to property, or damage to
the environment.
Hazardous Atmosphere. Any atmosphere that is oxygen deficient, contains a toxic
or disease-producing contaminant, or is potentially explosive. A hazardous
atmosphere could be immediately dangerous to life and health, but not
necessarily.
Hazardous Atmosphere for Confined Space. Any atmosphere that could expose personnel to the risk of
death, incapacitation, injury, acute illness, or impairment of the ability to
self-rescue, due to one or more of the following causes:
(a) Flammable
gas, vapor, or mist in excess of 10 percent of its lower flammable limit (LFL)
(b) *
Airborne combustible dust at a concentration that meets or exceeds its LFL
(c) Atmospheric
oxygen concentration below 19.5 percent or above 23.5 percent
(d) Atmospheric
concentration of any hazardous substance that could result in exposure to
personnel in excess of its dose or permissible exposure limit (PEL)
(e) Any
other atmospheric condition that is immediately dangerous to life or health
(IDLH)
Heavy Object. An item of such size and weight that it cannot be moved
without the use of power tools (e.g., hydraulic lifting devices) or complex
mechanical advantage systems.
High Angle.
Refers to an environment in which the load is predominately supported by the
rope rescue system.
Highline System. A system of using rope suspended between two points for
movement of persons or equipment over an area that is a barrier to the rescue
operation, including systems capable of movement between points of equal or
unequal height.
Hitch. A
knot that attaches to or wraps around an object so that when the object is
removed, the knot will fall apart.
Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health
(IDLH). Any condition that would do one of the
following:
(a) Pose
an immediate or delayed threat to life
(b) Cause
irreversible adverse health effects
(c) Interfere
with an individual’s ability to escape unaided from a hazardous environment
Imminent Hazard. An act or condition that is judged to present a danger to
persons or property and is so immediate and severe that it requires immediate
corrective or preventive action.
Incident Command System (ICS). The combination of facilities, equipment, personnel,
procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational
structure with responsibility for the management of assigned resources to
effectively accomplish stated objectives pertaining to an incident (as
described in the document Incident Command System) or training exercise.
Incident Commander. The person responsible for all decisions relating to the
management of the incident. The incident commander is in charge of the incident
site.
Incident Management System. The management system or command structure used during
emergency operations to identify clearly who is in command of the incident and
what roles and responsibilities are assigned to various members.
Incident Response Plan. Written procedures, including standard operating
guidelines, for managing an emergency response and operation.
Incident Scene.* The location where activities related to a specific
incident are conducted.
Isolation System (or Isolation Devices).* An arrangement of devices, applied with specific
techniques, that collectively serve to isolate a victim of a trench or
excavation emergency from the surrounding product (e.g., soil, gravel, or
sand).
Knot.* A
fastening made by tying together lengths of rope or webbing in a prescribed
way.
Laser Target. A square or rectangular plastic device used in conjunction
with a laser instrument to set the line and grade of pipe.
Life Safety Harness. A system component that is an arrangement of materials
secured about the body and used to support a person during rescue.
Life Safety Rope. A compact but flexible, torsionally balanced, continuous
structure of fibers produced from strands that are twisted, plaited, or braided
together and that serve primarily to support a load or transmit a force from
the point of origin to the point of application.
Litter. A
transfer device designed to support and protect a victim during movement.
Litter Attendant. A person who both accompanies and physically manages the
litter.
Load.
That which is being lowered or raised by rope in a high angle system. Some
examples include a rescue subject, a rescuer, and subjects in a litter with a
litter attendant.
Load Test.*
A method of preloading a rope rescue system to ensure all components are set
properly to sustain the expected load.
Lockout.*
A method for keeping equipment from being set in motion and endangering
workers.
Low Angle.
Refers to an environment in which the load is predominately supported by itself
and not the rope rescue system (e.g., flat land or mild sloping surface).
Lowering System.* A rope rescue system used to lower a load under control.
Machinery.
The moving parts of a particular machine.
Maximum Working Load. Weight supported by the life safety rope and system
components that must not be exceeded.
Mechanical Advantage (M/A).* A force created through mechanical means including, but
not limited to, a system of levers, gearing, or ropes and pulleys usually
creating an output force greater than the input force and expressed in terms of
a ratio of output force to input force.
Mitigation.
Activities taken, either prior to or following an incident, to eliminate or
reduce the degree of risk to life and property from hazards.
Multipoint Anchor System. System configuration providing load distribution either
proportionately or disproportionately over more than one anchor point. There
are basically two categories of multipoint anchor systems:
Load Distributing Anchor System.* An anchor system
established from two or more anchor points that maintains near equal loading on
the anchor points despite direction changes on the main line rope and
re-establishes a state of near-equal loading on remaining anchor points if any
one of them fails. (Also referred to as self-equalizing or self-adjusting.)
Load Sharing Anchor System.* An anchor system
established from two or more anchor points that distributes the load among the
anchor points somewhat proportionately but will not adjust to direction changes
on the main line rope.
National Search and Rescue Plan.* A document that identifies responsibilities of U.S.
federal agencies and serves as the basis for the National Search and Rescue
Manual, which discusses search and rescue organizations, resources,
methods, and techniques utilized by the federal government.
One-Call Utility Location Service. A service from which contractors, emergency service
personnel, and others can obtain information on the location of underground
utilities in any area.
Oxygen-Deficient Atmosphere. Air atmospheres containing less than 19.5 percent oxygen
by volume at one standard atmosphere pressure.
Oxygen-Enriched Atmosphere. Air atmospheres containing more than 23.5 percent oxygen
by volume at one standard atmosphere pressure.
Packaging (Patient Packaging). The process of securing a subject in a transfer device,
with regard to existing and potential injuries/illness, so as to avoid further
harm during movement.
Panel.
See Traditional Sheeting and Shoring.
Panel Team.
The group of individuals, with established communications and leadership,
assigned to construct (if necessary), move, place, and manage panels
(traditional sheeting panels) both inside and outside the space, trench, or
excavation.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).* The equipment provided to shield or isolate personnel from
infectious, chemical, physical, and thermal hazards.
Personnel.
Any individual participating within the incident scene.
Pier Hole (or Bell-Bottom). A type of shaft or footing excavation, the bottom of which
is made larger than the cross section above to form a bell shape.
Pre-Entry Briefing. Information passed to all personnel prior to entry into a
confined space or trench/excavation environment.
Preparation Phase. All actions and planning conducted prior to the initial
receipt of alarm.
Primary Access. The existing opening of doors and/or windows that provide
a pathway to the trapped and/or injured victim(s).
Protective System.* A method of protecting employees from cave-ins, from
material that could fall or roll from an excavation face or into an excavation,
or from the collapse of adjacent structures.
Public Safety Diver. An individual who performs public safety diving as defined
herein.
Public Safety Diving. Underwater diving, related to team operations and
training, performed by any member, group, or agency of a community or
government-recognized public safety diving or water rescue team.
Pulley. A
device with a free-turning, grooved metal wheel (sheave) used to reduce rope
friction. Side plates are available for a carabiner to be attached.
Raising System.* A rope rescue system used to raise a load under control.
Rapid Intervention Crew.* At least two members available for rescue of a member or a
team if the need arises.
“Reach, Throw, Row, Go.” The four sequential steps in water rescue with
progressively more risk to the rescuer. Specifically, a “go” rescue involves
physically entering the medium (e.g., in the water or on the ice).
Recovery.
Activities and programs designed to return the entity to an acceptable
condition.
Recovery Mode. Level of operational urgency where there is no chance of
rescuing a victim alive.
Redundant Air System. An independent secondary underwater breathing system
(i.e., a pony bottle with first and second stage or a pony bottle supplying a
bailout block).
Registered Professional Engineer.* A person who is registered as a professional engineer in
the state where the work is to be performed.
Rescue.
Those activities directed at locating endangered persons at an emergency
incident, removing those persons from danger, treating the injured, and
providing for transport to an appropriate health care facility.
Rescue Area (or Hot, Danger, or Collapse
Zone).* An area surrounding the incident site
(e.g., collapsed structure or trench) whose size is proportional to the hazards
that exist.
Rescue Attendant. A member of the rescue service who meets all requirements
of attendant as defined within this standard and who acts in that
capacity during a confined space rescue. (See also Attendant.)
Rescue Entrant. A person entering a confined space for the specific
purpose of rescue. This person shall meet the training requirements of an authorized
entrant specific to the space to be entered for rescue and shall meet all
requirements of members of the rescue service as defined within this
standard. (See also Authorized Entrant and Rescue Service.)
Rescue Equipment. See Confined Space Rescue Equipment.
Rescue Incident. An emergency incident that primarily involves the rescue
of persons subject to physical danger and that could include the provision of
emergency medical care, but not necessarily.
Rescue Mode. A level of operational urgency where there is a chance that a victim
will be rescued alive.
Rescue Service. The confined space rescue team designated by the AHJ to
rescue victims from within confined spaces, including operational and technical
levels of industrial, municipal, and private sector organizations. All rescue
services shall meet the following minimum requirements:
(a) Each
member of the rescue service shall be provided with, and trained to use
properly, the personal protective equipment and rescue equipment necessary for
making rescues from confined spaces according to his or her designated level of
competency.
(b) Each
member of the rescue service shall be trained to perform the assigned rescue
duties corresponding to his or her designated level of competency. Each member
of the rescue service shall also receive the training required of authorized
rescue entrants.
(c) Each
member of the rescue service shall practice making confined space rescues, in
accordance with the requirements of 2-1.6 of this document, by means of
simulated rescue operations in which they remove dummies, mannequins, or
persons from actual confined spaces or from representative confined spaces.
Representative confined spaces should — with respect to opening size,
configuration, and accessibility — simulate the types of confined spaces from
which rescue is to be performed.
(d) Each
member of the rescue service shall be certified to the level of first responder
or equivalent according to U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) First
Responder Guidelines. Each member of the rescue service shall also
successfully complete a course in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) taught
through the American Heart Association (AHA) to the level of a “Health Care
Provider,” through the American Red Cross (ARC) to the “CPR for the Professional
Rescuer” level, or through the National Safety Council’s equivalent course of
study.
(e) *
The rescue service shall be capable of responding in a timely manner to rescue
summons.
(f) Each
member of the rescue service shall be properly equipped, trained, and capable
of functioning appropriately to perform confined space rescues within the area
for which they are responsible at their designated level of competency. This
must be confirmed by an annual evaluation of the rescue service’s capabilities
to verify that the needed capabilities are present to perform confined space
rescues in terms of overall timeliness, training, and equipment and to perform
safe and effective rescue in those types of spaces to which the team must
respond.
(g) Each
member of the rescue service shall be aware of the hazards they could confront
when called on to perform rescue within confined spaces for which they are
responsible.
(h) If
required to provide confined space rescue within U.S. federally regulated
industrial facilities, the rescue service shall have access to all confined
spaces from which rescue could be necessary so that they can develop
appropriate rescue plans and practice rescue operations according to their
designated level of competency.
Rescue Team Leader. The person designated within the incident command system
as rescue group/division officer responsible for direct supervision of the
rescue team operations.
Resource Assessment. The component of the assessment phase that involves the
determination for the need for additional resources. Resource assessment can be
ongoing throughout the entire incident.
Resources.
All personnel and equipment that are available, or potentially available, for
assignment to incidents.
Respiratory Protection. Equipment designed to protect the wearer from the
inhalation of contaminants.
Response Agency. An organization capable of providing emergency services.
Retrieval Equipment (or Retrieval
System).* Combinations of rescue equipment
used for nonentry (external) rescue of persons from confined spaces.
Risk. A
measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects that result from an
exposure to a hazard.
Risk Assessment. An assessment of the likelihood, vulnerability, and
magnitude of incidents that could result from exposure to hazards.
Risk/Benefit Analysis.* A decision made by a responder based on a hazard and
situation assessment that weighs the risks likely to be taken against the
benefits to be gained for taking those risks.
Rope. See
Life Safety Rope.
Rope-Based Mechanical Advantage System
(Rope Mechanical Advantage System). A rope
rescue system component incorporating the reeving of rope through moving
pulleys (or similar devices) to create mechanical advantage.
Rope Rescue Equipment. Components used to build rope rescue systems including
life safety rope, life safety harnesses, and auxiliary rope rescue equipment.
Rope Rescue System. A system comprised of rope rescue equipment and an
appropriate anchor system intended for use in the rescue of a subject.
Safety Diver. An on-site diver available in a sufficient state of
readiness to assist another diver in the water.
Safety Officer. An individual qualified by the authority having
jurisdiction to maintain a safe working environment.
SAR.
Search and rescue.
Search Marking System. A separate and distinct marking system used to identify
information related to the location of a victim(s).
Secondary Access. Openings created by rescuers that provide a pathway to
trapped and/or injured victims.
Shall.
Indicates a mandatory requirement.
Sheeting.
The members of a shoring system that support the sides of an excavation and are
in turn supported by other members of the shoring system.
Shield (or Shield System).* A structure that is able to withstand the forces imposed
on it by a cave-in and thereby protect employees within the structures.
Shoring (or Shoring System). A structure such as a metal hydraulic,
pneumatic/mechanical, or timber shoring system that supports the sides of an
excavation and is designed to prevent cave-ins.
Shoring Team. The group of individuals, with established communications
and leadership, assigned to construct, move, place, and manage the shoring or
shoring system inside the space, trench, or excavation.
Sides.
See Face(s).
Simple Rope Mechanical Advantage System. A rope mechanical advantage system containing the
following:
(a) A
single rope
(b) One
or more moving pulleys (or similar devices), all traveling at the same speed
and in the same direction, attached directly or indirectly to the load
(c) In
the case of mechanical advantage systems greater than 2:1, one or more
stationary pulleys or similar devices
Single-Point Anchor System. An anchor system configuration utilizing a single anchor
point to provide the primary support for the rope rescue system. A single-point
anchor system includes those anchor systems that utilize one or more additional
nonloaded anchor points as backup to the primary anchor point.
Size-Up.
A mental process of evaluating the influencing factors at an incident prior to
committing resources to a course of action.
Sloping System.* A protecting system that uses inclined excavating to form
sides that are inclined away from the excavation so as to prevent cave-in.
Software.
A flexible fabric component of rope rescue equipment that can include, but is
not limited to, anchor straps, pick-off straps, and rigging slings.
Special Operations. Those emergency incidents to which the responding agency
responds that require specific and advanced technical training and specialized
tools and equipment.
Standard Operating Guideline. An organizational directive that establishes a course of
action or policy.
Standard Operating Procedure. An organizational directive that establishes a standard
course of action.
Strongback.
See Uprights.
Supplemental Sheeting and Shoring.* Sheeting and shoring operations that involve the use of
commercial sheeting/shoring systems and/or isolation devices or that involve
cutting and placement of sheeting and shoring when greater than two feet of
shoring exists below the bottom of the strongback.
Support System. A structure — such as underpinning, bracing, or shoring —
that provides support to an adjacent structure, underground installation, or
the sides of an excavation.
Surcharge Loads. Any weight near the lip of the trench that increases the
likelihood of instability or secondary cave-in.
Swift Water. Water moving at a rate greater than one knot (1.15 mph).
System Safety Check.* A method of evaluating the safe assembly of a rescue
system.
System Stress. Any condition creating excessive force (i.e., exceeding
the maximum working load of any component) to components within a rope rescue
system that could lead to damage or failure of the system.
Tabulated Data.* Any set of site-specific design data used by a
professional engineer to design a protective system at a particular location.
Tagout. A
method of tagging, labeling, or otherwise marking an isolation device during
hazard abatement operations to prevent accidental removal of the device. (See
also Lockout.)
Technical Rescue. The application of special knowledge, skills, and
equipment to safely resolve unique and/or complex rescue situations.
Technical Rescue Incident.* Complex rescue incidents requiring specially trained
personnel and special equipment to complete the mission.
Tender.
An individual trained in the responsibilities of diver safety who provides
control of search patterns from the surface of the water.
Termination. That portion of incident management in which personnel are involved in
documenting safety procedures, site operations, hazards faced, and lessons
learned from the incident. Termination is divided into three phases: debriefing
the incident, post-incident analysis, and critiquing the incident.
Terrain.*
Specific natural and topographical features within an environment.
Terrain Hazard.* Specific terrain feature, or feature-related condition,
that exposes one to danger and the potential for injury and/or death.
Testing.
The process by which the hazards that could confront entrants of a trench or
excavation are identified and evaluated, including specifying tests that are to
be performed in a trench or excavation.
Topographical Map. A graphical representation of the earth’s surface, drawn
to scale and reproduced in two dimensions, that reflects the topographical
features of the area depicted.
Traditional Sheeting and Shoring.* The use of 4 ft 
8 ft (1.2 mm 2.4 mm) sheet panels, with a strongback
attachment, supplemented by a variety of conventional shoring options such as
hydraulic, screw, and/or pneumatic shores.
Transfer Device. Various devices, including litters and harnesses, used
with rope rescue systems to package and allow safe removal of a subject from a
specific rescue environment.
Trench (or Trench Excavation).* A narrow (in relation to its length) excavation made below
the surface of the earth.
Trench Box (or Trench Shield). A manufactured protection system unit made from steel,
fiberglass, or aluminum that is placed in a trench to protect workers from
cave-in and that can be moved as a unit. (See also Shield.)
Trench Emergency. Any failure of hazard control or monitoring equipment or
other event(s) inside or outside a trench or excavation that could endanger
entrants within the trench or excavation.
Uprights (or Strongback).* The vertical members of a trench shoring system placed in
contact with the earth, usually held in place against sections of sheeting with
shores and positioned so that individual members do not contact each other.
Vehicle.
A device or structure for transporting persons or things; a conveyance.
Vertical Environment. See High Angle.
Wales (or Walers or Stringers). Horizontal members of a shoring system placed parallel to
the excavation face and whose sides bear against the vertical members of a
shoring system or earth.
Water Hazard Zone. In water rescue, the zone includes the area covered by
water or ice.
Watermanship Skills. Capabilities that include swimming, surface diving,
treading water, and staying afloat with a reasonable degree of comfort
appropriate to the required task.
Webbing.
Woven material of flat or tubular weave in the form of a long strip.
Wilderness.* An uncultivated, uninhabited, and natural area usually, but not
necessarily, far from human civilization and trappings.
Wire Rope.
Rope made of twisted strands of wire.
The AHJ shall establish levels of
operational capability needed to conduct operations at technical rescue
incidents safely and effectively based on hazard analysis, risk assessment,
training level of personnel, and availability of internal and external
resources.
The AHJ shall establish written
standard operating procedures consistent with one of the following operational
levels.
(a) Awareness.
This level represents the minimum capability of a responder who, in the course
of his or her regular job duties, could be called upon to respond to, or could
be the first on the scene of, a technical rescue incident. This level can
involve search, rescue, and recovery operations. Members of a team at this
level are generally not considered rescuers.
(b) Operations.
This level represents the capability of hazard recognition, equipment use, and
techniques necessary to safely and effectively support and participate in a
technical rescue incident. This level can involve search, rescue, and recovery
operations, but usually operations are carried out under the supervision of
technician-level personnel.
(c) Technician.
This level represents the capability of hazard recognition, equipment use, and
techniques necessary to safely and effectively coordinate, perform, and
supervise a technical rescue incident. This level can involve search, rescue,
and recovery operations.
The AHJ shall establish operational
procedures to ensure that technical rescue operations are performed in a safe
manner consistent with the identified level of operational capability. In
addition, the same techniques used in a rescue operation shall be considered
appropriate for training, body recovery, evidence search, and other operations
with a level of urgency commensurate with the risk/benefit analysis.
Operational procedures shall not exceed
the identified level of capability established in 2-1.1.
Medical care shall be provided for
victims of rescue operations and shall be, as a minimum, at the basic life
support (BLS) level.
The AHJ shall provide for training in
the responsibilities that are commensurate with the identified operational
capability of each member. The minimum training for all members shall be at the
awareness level. Members expected to perform at a higher operational level
shall be trained to that level.
The AHJ shall provide for the necessary
continuing education to maintain all requirements of the organization’s
identified level of capability. This shall include annual performance
evaluations of the organization based on requirements of this standard.
The AHJ shall be responsible for the
documentation of all required training. This documentation shall be maintained
and available for inspection by individual team members and their authorized
representatives.
Prior to operating at a technical
rescue incident, an organization shall meet the requirements of Chapter 2 of
this standard along with one or more of the appropriate requirements of
Chapters 3 through 9 for the specific technical rescue incident.
The AHJ shall ensure that there is a
standard operating procedure to evacuate members from an area and account for
their safety when an imminent hazard condition is discovered. This procedure
shall include a method to notify all members in the affected area immediately
by any effective means including audible warning devices, visual signals, and
radio signals.
The AHJ shall comply with all
applicable local, state, and federal laws.
The AHJ shall train appropriate
personnel in procedures for invoking relevant components of the National Search
and Rescue Plan, The Federal Response Plan, and other state and local response
plans.
2-2 Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment.
The AHJ shall conduct a hazard analysis
and risk assessment of the response area and shall determine the feasibility of
conducting technical rescue. Potential hazards and their likelihood of causing
an incident shall be identified.
The hazard analysis and risk assessment
shall include an evaluation of the environmental, physical, social, and
cultural factors influencing the scope, frequency, and magnitude of a potential
technical rescue incident and the impact they might have on the ability of the
AHJ to respond to and to operate safely at those incidents.
The AHJ shall identify the type and
availability of internal resources needed for technical rescue incidents and
shall maintain a list of these resources.
The AHJ shall identify the type and
availability of external resources needed to augment existing capabilities for
technical rescue incidents and shall maintain a list of these resources. This
list shall be updated at least on an annual basis.
The AHJ shall establish procedures for
the acquisition of those external resources needed for technical rescue
incidents.
The hazard analysis and risk assessment
shall be documented.
The hazard analysis and risk assessment
shall be reviewed and updated on a scheduled basis and as operational or
organizational changes occur.
The AHJ shall conduct periodic surveys
in the organization’s response area for the purpose of identifying the types of
technical rescues that are most likely to occur.
2-3 Incident Response Planning.
The procedures for a technical rescue
emergency response shall be documented in the special operations incident
response plan. The plan shall be a formal, written document.
Where external resources are required
to achieve a desired level of operational capability, mutual aid agreements
shall be developed with other organizations.
Copies of the technical rescue incident
response plan shall be distributed to agencies, departments, and employees
having responsibilities designated in the plan.
A record shall be kept of all holders
of the technical rescue incident response plan, and a system shall be
implemented for issuing all changes or revisions.
The technical rescue incident response
plan shall be approved by the AHJ through a formal, documented approval process
and shall be coordinated with participating agencies and organizations.
The AHJ shall ensure that equipment
commensurate with the respective operational capabilities for safe and
effective operations at technical rescue incidents and training exercises is
provided.
Training shall be provided to ensure
that all equipment is used and maintained in accordance with the manufacturers’
instructions.
Procedures for the inventory and
accountability of all equipment shall be developed and used.
2-4.2 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
The AHJ shall ensure that the
appropriate protective clothing and equipment to provide protection from those
hazards to which personnel are exposed or could be exposed is provided. Such
protective equipment shall be appropriate to the tasks that are expected to be
performed during technical rescue incidents and training exercises.
Personnel shall be trained in the care,
use, inspection, maintenance, and limitations of the protective clothing and
equipment assigned or available for their use.
The AHJ shall ensure that all personnel
wear and use appropriate personal protective equipment while working in known
or suspected hazardous areas during technical rescue incidents and training
exercises.
The AHJ shall ensure that fresh-air
breathing apparatus in the form of supplied air respirators or self-contained
breathing apparatus (SCBA) are available when required for technical rescue
operations. All apparatus shall be worn in accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommendations. An adequate supply source providing a minimum of Grade D
breathing air shall be provided for all fresh-air breathing apparatus. Supplied
air respirators shall be used in conjunction with a self-contained breathing
air supply capable of providing enough air for egress in the event of a primary
air supply failure.
All personnel shall receive training
related to the hazards and risks associated with technical rescue operations.
All personnel shall receive training
for conducting rescue operations in a safe and effective manner while using
appropriate PPE.
The AHJ shall ensure that members
assigned duties and functions at technical rescue incidents and training
exercises meet the pertinent requirements of Sections 6-4 and 6-5 of NFPA 1500,
Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program.
Where members are operating in
positions or performing functions at an incident or training exercise that pose
a high potential risk for injury, members qualified in basic life support shall
be standing by.
Rescuers shall not be armed except when
it is required to meet the objectives of the incident as determined by the AHJ.
At technical rescue training exercises
and in actual operations, the incident commander shall assign a safety officer
with the specific knowledge and responsibility for the identification, the
evaluation, and, when possible, the correction of hazardous conditions and
unsafe practices. This assignment shall meet the requirements in Chapter 4 of
NFPA 1521, Standard for Fire Department Safety Officer.
The safety officer shall be readily
identifiable.
2-5.3 Incident Management System.
The AHJ shall provide for and utilize
training on the implementation of an incident management system that meets the
requirements in Chapters 2 and 3 of NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire Department
Incident Management System, with written standard operating procedures
applying to all members involved in emergency operations. All members involved
in emergency operations shall be familiar with the system.
The AHJ shall provide for training on
the implementation of an incident personnel accountability system that meets
the requirements of Section 2-6 of NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire Department
Incident Management System.
The incident commander shall ensure
rotation of personnel to reduce stress and fatigue.
The incident commander shall ensure
that all personnel are aware of the potential impact of their operations on the
safety and welfare of other rescuers, victims, and other activities at the
incident site.
The AHJ shall ensure that members are
psychologically, physically, and medically capable to perform assigned duties
and functions at technical rescue incidents and to perform training exercises
in accordance with Chapter 8 of NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department
Occupational Safety and Health Program.
Organizations operating at structural
collapse incidents shall meet all the requirements specified in Chapter 2 of
this standard.
The AHJ shall evaluate the effects of
severe weather, extremely hazardous collapse sites, and other difficult
conditions to determine whether their present training program has prepared the
organization to operate safely.
Organizations operating at the
awareness level shall meet all awareness-level requirements regarding confined
space rescue specified in Section 5-2.
Awareness-level functions at structural
collapse incidents shall include the following:
(a) *
Size-up of existing and potential conditions at structural collapse incidents
(b) *
Identification of the resources necessary to conduct safe and effective
structural collapse search and rescue operations
(c) *
Development and implementation of procedures for carrying out the emergency
response system for structural collapse incidents
(d) *
Development and implementation of procedures for carrying out site control and
scene management
(e) *
Recognition of general hazards associated with structural collapse incidents
including the recognition of applicable construction types and categories and
the expected behaviors of components and materials in a structural collapse
(f) *
Identification of five types of collapse patterns and potential victim
locations
(g) *
Recognition of the potential for secondary collapse
(h) *
Development and implementation of procedures for conducting visual and verbal
searches at structural collapse incidents, while using appropriate methods for
the specific type of collapse
(i) *
Development and implementation of procedures for the recognition and
implementation of the FEMA Task Force Search and Rescue Marking System,
Building Marking System (structure/hazard evaluation), and Structure Marking
System (structure identification within a geographic area)
(j) Development
and implementation of procedures for the removal of readily accessible victims
from structural collapse incidents
Organizations operating at the
operations level shall meet all awareness-level requirements specified in
Section 3-2. In addition, members shall be capable of hazard recognition,
equipment use, and techniques necessary to operate safely and effectively at
structural collapse incidents involving the collapse or failure of light-frame
ordinary construction and unreinforced and reinforced masonry construction.
Organizations operating at the
operations level shall meet all operations-level requirements regarding rope,
confined space, transportation/machinery, and trench specified in Sections 4-3,
5-3, 6-3, and 9-3. Organizations operating at the operations level shall also
meet all awareness-level requirements regarding water rescue specified in
Section 7-2.
Operations-level functions at
structural collapse incidents for light-frame ordinary construction and
reinforced and unreinforced masonry construction shall include the development
and implementation of the following:
(a) Procedures
for recognizing unique collapse or failure hazards
(b) *
Procedures for search operations intended to locate victims trapped inside and
beneath collapse debris
(c) *
Procedures for accessing victims trapped inside and beneath collapse debris
(d) *
Procedures for performing extrication operations involving packaging, treating,
and removing victims trapped within and beneath collapse debris
(e) Procedures
for stabilizing the structure
Organizations operating at the
technician level shall meet all operations-level requirements specified in
Section 3-3 and all awareness-level requirements specified in Section 3-2. In
addition, members shall be capable of hazard recognition, equipment use, and
techniques necessary to operate safely and effectively at structural collapse
incidents involving the collapse or failure of concrete tilt-up, reinforced
concrete, and steel construction.
Organizations operating at the
technician level shall meet all technician-level requirements regarding rope,
confined space, transportation/machinery, and trench specified in Sections 4-4,
5-4, 6-4, and 9-4.
Technician-level functions at
structural collapse incidents for concrete tilt-up, reinforced concrete, and
steel construction shall include the development and implementation of the
following:
(a) Procedures
for recognizing unique collapse or failure hazards
(b) *
Procedures for search operations intended to locate victims trapped inside and
beneath collapse debris
(c) *
Procedures for accessing victims trapped inside and beneath collapse debris
(d) *
Procedures for performing extrication operations involving packaging, treating,
and removing victims trapped within and beneath collapse debris
(e) Procedures
for stabilizing the structure
Organizations operating at rope rescue
incidents shall meet all the requirements specified in Chapter 2 of this
standard.
The AHJ shall evaluate the effects of
severe weather, extreme heights, and other difficult conditions to determine
whether the present training program has prepared the organization to operate
safely.
Organizations operating at the
awareness level shall meet all the requirements of Section 4-2.
Awareness-level functions shall include
the following:
(a) *
Size-up of existing and potential conditions where rope rescue operations will
be performed
(b) *
Identification of the resources necessary to conduct safe and effective rope
rescue operations
(c) *
Development and implementation of procedures for carrying out the emergency
response system where rescue is required
(d) *
Development and implementation of procedures for carrying out site control and
scene management
(e) *
Recognition of general hazards associated with rope rescue and the procedures
necessary to mitigate these hazards within the general rescue area
(f) *
Development and implementation of procedures for the identification and
utilization of personal protective equipment assigned for use at a rope rescue
incident
Organizations operating at the
operations level shall meet all requirements specified in Sections 4-2 and 4-3.
Operations-level functions shall
include the development and implementation of the following:
(a) Procedures
for the selection, construction, and use of rope-based mechanical advantage
systems
(b) Procedures
for establishing the need, selecting the proper equipment, and placing edge
protection
(c) *
Procedures for the safe construction and use of single-point and multipoint
anchor systems within the scope of the organization’s training
(d) Procedures
for the safe selection, construction, and use of an appropriate belay system
(e) *
Procedures for selection, construction, and use of a lowering system within the
scope of the organization’s training
(f) *
Procedures for properly tying any knots used by the rope rescue team
(g) *
Procedures for assuring safety in rope rescue operations
(h) Procedures
for appropriately packaging a patient in a litter
(i) Procedures
for the selection, use, and maintenance of proper rope rescue equipment and
rope rescue systems
(j) *
Procedures for selection, construction, and use of a raising system in the
low-angle environment
(k) Procedures
for safely ascending and descending a fixed rope within the scope of the
organization’s training
(l) Procedures
for using litter attendants in the low-angle environment
Organizations operating at the
technician level shall meet all requirements specified in Sections 4-2, 4-3,
and 4-4.
Technician-level functions shall
include the development and implementation of the following:
(a) Procedures
for the safe construction and use of load distributing anchor systems
(b) Procedures
for the selection, construction, and use of a high-line rope system within the
scope of the organization’s training
(c) *
Procedures for the selection, construction, and use of a rope-based raising
system in a high-angle environment within the scope of the organization’s
training
(d) Procedures
for passing knots through a rope rescue system
(e) Procedures
for using litter attendants in the high-angle environment
Organizations operating at confined
space incidents shall meet all the requirements specified in Chapter 2 of this
standard.
The AHJ shall evaluate the effects of
severe weather, extremely hazardous situations, and other difficult conditions
to determine whether the present training program has prepared the organization
to operate safely.
5-1.3* Operational Capability.
The requirements of this chapter apply
to organizations that provide varying degrees of response to confined space
emergencies. The scope of this standard includes all confined space rescue
incidents and response organizations including those not regulated by U.S.
federal mandates.
Organizations operating at the
awareness level shall meet the requirements of Sections 4-2 and 5-2 of this
document and Chapter 2 of NFPA 472, Standard for Professional Competence of
Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents. Organizations at this level
shall be responsible for performing certain nonentry rescue (retrieval)
operations.
Awareness-level functions for confined
space rescue incidents shall include the following:
(a) *
Size-up of existing and potential conditions
(b) Initiation
of contact and establishment of communications with victims where possible
(c) *
Recognition and identification of the hazards associated with nonentry confined
space emergencies
(d) *
Recognition of confined spaces
(e) *
Procedures to perform a nonentry retrieval
(f) *
Procedures for implementing the emergency response system for confined space
emergencies
(g) *
Procedures for implementing site control and scene management
Organizations operating at the
operations level shall meet the requirements of Sections 5-2 and 5-3. The
organization at this level shall be responsible for the development and
training of a confined space rescue team consistent with the requirements of
this section.
Organizations operating at the
operations level shall meet all operations-level requirements specified in
Section 4-3 and the requirements of a confined space rescue team as defined
herein. In addition, organizations operating at the operations level shall meet
all requirements specified in Section 9-3.
Operations-level functions for confined
space rescue operations shall include the following:
(a) *
Procedures for protecting personnel from hazards within the confined space
(b) *
Continued size-up of existing and potential conditions
(c) *
Procedures for assuring that personnel are capable of appropriately managing
the physical and psychological challenges that effect rescuers entering
confined spaces
(d) *
Identification of the duties of the rescue entrant(s) and back-up rescue
entrant(s), rescue attendant, and rescue team leader as defined herein
(e) *
Procedures to monitor continuously, or at frequent intervals, the atmosphere in
all parts of the space to be entered and to monitor for, in the following
order, oxygen content, flammability (LEL/ LFL), and toxicity
(f) *
Procedures for entry-type rescues into confined spaces meeting all of the
following specific qualifying characteristics:
1. * The internal configuration of the space is clear and
unobstructed so retrieval systems can be utilized for rescuers without possibility
of entanglement.
2. * The victim can be easily seen from the outside of the space’s
primary access opening.
3. * Rescuers can pass easily through the access/egress opening(s)
with room to spare when PPE is worn in the manner recommended by the manufacturer.
4. * The space can accommodate two or more rescuers in addition to
the victim.
5. * All hazards in and around the confined space have been
identified, isolated, and controlled.
(g) *
Procedures for the safe and effective use of victim packaging devices that
could be employed in confined space rescue
(h) Procedures
for the transfer of victim information including location, surroundings,
condition when found, present condition, and other information pertinent to
emergency medical services
(i) *
Procedures for planning and implementing an appropriate confined space rescue
operation
(j) *
Procedures for selection, construction, and use of a rope lowering and raising
system in the high-angle environment
Organizations operating at the
technician level shall meet the requirements of Sections 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4. The
organization at this level shall be responsible for the development and
training of a confined space rescue team consistent with the requirements of
this section.
Technician-level functions for confined
space rescue operations shall include the following:
(a) *
Continued size-up of existing and potential conditions
(b) *
Procedures to assure that rescue team members shall take part in a medical
surveillance program
(c) *
Planning response for entry-type confined space rescues in hazardous
environments
(d) *
Implemention of the planned response
Organizations operating at vehicle
and/or machinery rescue incidents shall meet all the requirements specified in
Chapter 2 of this standard.
The AHJ shall evaluate the effects of
severe weather, extremely hazardous situations, and other difficult conditions
to determine whether their present training program has prepared the
organization to operate safely.
Organizations operating at the
awareness level shall meet all requirements specified in Chapter 2 of NFPA 472,
Standard for Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials
Incidents.
Awareness-level functions at vehicle
and machinery rescue incidents shall include the development and implementation
of the following:
(a) *
Procedures to conduct a size-up of existing and potential conditions
(b) *
Procedures for the identification of the resources necessary to conduct safe
and effective operations
(c) *
Procedures for implementing the emergency response system for vehicle and/or
machinery rescue incidents
(d) *
Procedures for implementing site control and scene management
(e) *
Recognition of general hazards associated with vehicle and/or machinery rescue
incidents
(f) Procedures
for the initiation of traffic control
Organizations operating at the
operations level shall meet all the requirements specified in Sections 6-2 and
6-3. In addition, members shall be capable of hazard recognition, equipment
use, and techniques necessary to operate safely and effectively at incidents involving
persons injured or entrapped in a vehicle or machinery.
Organizations operating at the
operations level shall meet all requirements specified in Chapter 3 of NFPA
472, Standard for Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous
Materials Incidents.
Operations-level functions at vehicle
and/or machinery rescue incidents shall include the development and
implementation of the following:
(a) Procedures
to identify probable victim locations and survivability
(b) *
Procedures for making the rescue area safe, including the stabilization and
isolation (e.g., lockout/tagout) of all vehicles and/or machinery
(c) Procedures
to identify, contain, and stop fuel release
(d) Procedures
for the protection of a victim during extrication/disentanglement
(e) Procedures
for the packaging of a victim prior to extrication and/or disentanglement
(f) Procedures
for accessing victims trapped in a vehicle and/or machinery
(g) *
Procedures for performing extrication and disentanglement operations involving
packaging, treating, and removing victims trapped in vehicles and/or machinery
through the use of hand tools
(h) *
Procedures for the mitigation and management of general and specific hazards
(i.e., fires and explosions) associated with vehicle and/or machinery rescue
incidents
(i) Procedures
for the procurement and utilization of the resources necessary to conduct safe
and effective vehicle and/or machinery rescue operations
(j) Procedures
for maintaining control of traffic at the scene of vehicle and/or machinery
rescue incidents
Organizations operating at the
technician level shall meet all the requirements specified in Sections 6-2,
6-3, and 6-4. In addition, members shall be capable of hazard recognition,
equipment use, and techniques necessary to operate and effectively supervise at
vehicle and/or machinery rescue incidents.
Technician-level functions at vehicle
and/or machinery rescue incidents shall include the development and
implementation of the following:
(a) *
Procedures for performing extrication and disentanglement operations involving
packaging, treating, and removing victims injured and/or trapped in large/heavy
vehicles and/or machinery
(b) *
Procedures for the advanced stabilization of unusual vehicle and machinery
rescue situations
(c) *
Procedures for the use of all specialized rescue equipment immediately available
and in use by the organization
Organizations operating at water
incidents shall meet all the requirements specified in Chapter 2 of this
standard.
The AHJ shall evaluate the effects of
severe weather, extreme water conditions, and other difficult conditions to
determine whether the present training program has prepared the organization to
operate safely.
Organizations operating at the
awareness level shall meet all the requirements in Section 7-2. All members of
organizations at the awareness level shall meet the requirements of competent
person as defined in Section 1-3 of this standard.
Awareness-level functions at water
incidents shall include the development and implementation of the following:
(a) *
Procedures for implementing the assessment phase
(b) *
Procedures for size-up of existing and potential conditions
(c) *
Procedures for the identification of the resources necessary to conduct safe
and effective water operations
(d) *
Procedures for implementing the emergency response system for water incidents
(e) *
Procedures for implementing site control and scene management
(f) *
Procedures for recognition of general hazards associated with water incidents
and the procedures necessary to mitigate these hazards within the general
rescue area
(g) Procedures
to determine rescue versus body recovery
Organizations operating at the
operations level shall meet all the requirements specified in Section 7-2.
For the purposes of this standard,
there shall be four separate water-related disciplines for the operations
level: dive, ice, surf, and swift water.
Organizations operating at the
operations level shall meet all the requirements specified in 7-3.1 through
7-3.5. Organizations operating at the operations level of one or more specific
disciplines shall meet the requirements of 7-3.1 through 7-3.5 as they relate
to the specific discipline as well as the specific requirements (given in
7-3.6, 7-3.7, 7-3.8, or 7-3.9) of that discipline.
For personnel operating in the hazard
zone, the minimum personal protective equipment (PPE) provided shall include
the following:
(a) Personal
flotation device (PFD)
(b) Thermal
protection
(c) *
Helmet appropriate for water rescue
(d) Cutting
device
(e) Whistle
(f) Contamination
protection (as needed)
Operations-level functions at all water
incidents shall include the development and implementation of the following:
(a) *
Procedures to insure personal safety at water operations
(b) *
Procedures to assess water conditions in terms of hazards to the victim and rescuer
(c) Procedures
to separate, isolate, secure, and interview witnesses
(d) *
Procedures to determine the method of victim entrapment
(e) *
Procedures to evaluate the progress of the planned response to ensure the
objectives are being met safely, effectively, and efficiently
(f) *
Procedures to safely and effectively conduct shore-based rescue operations
(g) *
Procedures using throw bags
(h) *
Procedures to supply assistance with rigging and mechanical advantage systems
to technician-level personnel
(i) Procedures
to deploy, operate, and recover any watercraft used by the organization
(j) *
Procedures for survival swimming and self-rescue
(k) *
Procedures for identifying and managing heat and cold stress to the rescuer
while utilizing PPE
(l) Procedures
for the safe and effective use of victim packaging devices that could be
employed by the organization for water rescue
(m) *
Procedures for the transfer of victim information including location,
surroundings, condition when found, present condition, and other information
pertinent to emergency medical services
(n) *
Procedures for boat-assisted and boat-based operations if boats are used by the
organization
(o) A
plan to meet operational objectives
(p) *
Procedures for rapid extrication of accessible victims
(q) Procedures
for surface water-based search operations
Operations-level functions at dive
incidents shall include the development and implementation of the following:
(a) *
Procedures for the recognition of the unique hazards associated with dive
operations
(b) *
Procedures for serving as surface support personnel
(c) Procedures
for the identification of water characteristics
(d) *
Procedures for the operation of surface support equipment used in water
operations
(e) Procedures
for procuring the necessary equipment to perform dive operations
(f) Procedures
for the safe entry and recovery of divers from the water
(g) *
Procedures for participating in safe dive operations in any climate the
organization can encounter
Operations-level functions at ice
rescue incidents shall include the development and implementation of the
following:
(a) *
Procedures for the recognition of the unique hazards associated with ice rescue
operations
(b) *
Procedures for the identification of water and ice characteristics
(c) *
Procedures for the operation of surface support equipment used in water/ice
rescue operations
(d) Procedures
for procuring the necessary equipment to perform ice rescue operations
(e) *
Procedures to recognize and deal with a victim’s hypothermia
(f) Procedures
for the safe entry of divers into the water through an ice hole, if ice diving
is performed by the organization
Operations-level functions at surf
rescue incidents shall include the development and implementation of the
following:
(a) *
Procedures for the recognition of the unique hazards associated with surf
rescue operations
(b) Procedures
for the operation of surface support equipment used in surf rescue operations
(c) Procedures
for procuring the necessary equipment to perform surf rescue operations
(d) *
Procedures for self-rescue and survival swimming in surf
Organizations operating at the
operations level shall meet all the operations-level requirements specified in
Section 4-3 of this standard.
Operations-level functions at swift
water rescue incidents shall include the development and implementation of the
following:
(a) *
Procedures to assess moving water conditions, characteristics, and features in
terms of hazards to the victim and rescuer
(b) Procedures
to determine the method of victim entrapment
(c) *
Procedures for using tag lines and tension diagonals (zip lines)
(d) *
Procedures for self-rescue and survival swimming in swift water
Organizations operating at the
technician level shall meet all the requirements specified in 7-3.1 through
7-3.5.
For the purposes of this standard,
there shall be four separate water-related disciplines for the technician
level: dive, ice, surf, and swift water.
Organizations operating at the
technician level shall meet all the requirements specified in 7-4.1 through
7-4.6. Organizations operating at the technician level of one or more specific
disciplines shall meet the requirements of 7-4.1 through 7-4.6 as they relate
to the specific discipline as well as the specific requirements (given in
7-4.7, 7-4.8, 7-4.9, or 7-4.10) of that discipline.
Organizations operating at the
technician level shall meet all the awareness-level requirements specified in
NFPA 472, Standard for Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous
Materials Incidents.
Personnel operating within an
organization at the technician level shall possess a level of watermanship
skill and comfort appropriate to the required task.
Technician-level functions at all water
rescues shall include the development and implementation of the following:
(a) Procedures
required to plan a response within the capabilities of available resources
(b) Procedures
to implement a planned response consistent with the organization’s capabilities
(c) *
Procedures for conducting both boat-assisted and boat-based rescues
(d) *
Procedures to conduct a “go” rescue
At the entry level and for any
specialties utilized by an organization at the technician level, the AHJ shall
ensure provision of certification by a nationally recognized agency. The
curriculum for such certification shall be oriented toward the needs and
operational requirements of public safety diving as defined herein.
Annual fundamental SCUBA skill reviews
shall be conducted to maintain public safety diver capability.
Technician-level functions at dive
incidents shall include the development and implementation of the following:
(a) *
Procedures for skin and SCUBA diving, including the use of any associated
equipment
(b) Procedures
for the application of physics and physiology as it relates to the underwater
environment
(c) *
Procedures for the safe use of dive tables
(d) Procedures
for dealing with the various underwater environments with which the rescue
diver could come into contact
(e) Procedures
for avoiding and dealing with underwater plants and animals
(f) Procedures
for the safe conduct and supervision of dive operations
(g) Procedures
for the use of relevant search theory and techniques
(h) *
Procedures for the identification and management of dive-related maladies
including air embolism and decompression sickness
(i) Procedures
for recognizing and managing the impact of near-drowning in cold water
(j) *
Procedures for effective underwater communication
Technician-level functions at ice
rescue incidents shall include the development and implementation of the
following:
(a) *
Procedures for self-rescue unique to ice rescue
(b) Procedures
for reach, throw, row, and go technique rescues unique to ice rescue
(c) Procedures
for the use of watercraft, specialty craft, and specialty equipment unique to
ice rescue
Technician-level functions at surf
rescue incidents shall include the development and implementation of the
following:
(a) Procedures
for reach, throw, row, and go technique rescues unique to surf rescue
(b) Procedures
for the use of watercraft, specialty craft, and specialty equipment unique to
surf rescue
Organizations operating at the
technician level shall meet all the technician-level requirements specified in
Section 4-4 of this standard.
Technician-level functions at swift
water rescues shall include the development and implementation of procedures
for the application of rope rescue techniques in the swift water environment.
Organizations operating at wilderness
search and rescue incidents shall meet all the requirements specified in
Chapter 2 of this standard.
The AHJ shall evaluate the effects of
severe weather, extreme heights, difficult terrain, high-altitude operations,
and other difficult conditions to determine whether their present training
program has prepared the organization to operate safely.
Organizations operating at the
awareness level shall meet the requirements of Section 8-2.
Members of organizations at the
awareness level shall be permitted to assist in support functions on a
wilderness search/rescue operation but shall not be deployed into the
wilderness.
Awareness-level functions at a
wilderness incident shall include the following:
(a) *
Conducting a size-up of existing and potential conditions
(b) *
Developing and implementing procedures for implementing the emergency response
system for wilderness SAR
(c) *
Implementing site control and scene management
(d) *
Recognizing the general hazards associated with wilderness search and rescue
incidents
(e) Recognizing
the type of terrain involved in wilderness search and rescue incidents
(f) *
Recognizing the limitations of conventional emergency response skills and
equipment in various wilderness environments
(g) *
Initiating the collection and recording of information necessary to assist
operational personnel in a wilderness search and rescue
(h) *
Identifying and isolating the reporting party(s) and witnesses
Organizations operating at the
operations level shall meet the requirements of Section 8-2. In addition,
organizations operating at the operations level shall meet all the requirements
specified in Section 4-3.
Operations-level functions performed in
the wilderness shall be under the supervision of personnel from
technician-level organizations. The AHJ shall establish standard operating
procedures that identify the specific environments in which operations-level
personnel can safely operate. Outside of these specific environments, personnel
from technician-level organizations or special resources shall be utilized.
Operations-level functions at a
wilderness incident shall include the following:
(a) *
Request of and interface with wilderness search and rescue resources
(b) *
Provision of the specialized medical care that is unique to the wilderness
environment
(c) *
Personal survival, body management, and preparedness for the specific
wilderness environments in which the rescuer could become involved
(d) Recognition
of the need for, and procedures and equipment for the provision of,
environmental protection through clothing systems appropriate for the specific
wilderness environments in which the rescuer could become involved
(e) *
Selection, care, and use of appropriately packed and carried personal medical
and support equipment
(f) *
Ability to travel safely through various wilderness environments in which the
rescuer could become involved
(g) Land
navigation techniques using map and compass as well as any methods of
navigation and position reporting utilized by the responding organizations with
which the rescuer could become involved
(h) Procurement
of any necessary maps and navigational and topographical information
(i) Modification
of actions and urgency appropriately for a rescue versus a body recovery
(j) Acquisition
of information on current and forecast weather including temperature,
precipitation, and winds
(k) *
Participation in and support of wilderness search operations intended to locate
victims whose exact location is unknown
(l) Access
to, as well as extrication of, victims in any specific wilderness environments
and terrain encountered in the response area
(m) Utilization,
recognition, and identification of all rescue hardware and software used by the
responding organizations with which the rescuer could become involved
(n) Ability
to work safely in and around any aircraft, watercraft, and special vehicles
used for SAR operations
(o) *
Recognition of the team’s limitations regarding accessing and/or evacuating a
victim
Organizations operating at the
technician level shall meet the requirements of Sections 8-2 and 8-3. In
addition, organizations operating at the technician level shall meet the
requirements of Sections 4-4 and 7-2.
Organizations operating at the
technician level shall be capable of performing and supervising wilderness
technical rescue incidents that involve both search and rescue operations.
Wilderness rescue organizations at the
technician level shall not be required to specialize in all aspects of
wilderness rescue. The ability of the team to respond at the technician level
in one aspect shall not imply the ability to respond at the technician level in
all aspects of wilderness rescue.
Technician-level functions at a
wilderness incident shall include the following:
(a) Acquisition,
utilization, and coordination of search and rescue resources with which the rescuer
could become involved
(b) Development
of or provision of input to necessary standard operating procedures for
anticipated wilderness responses
(c) *
Performance of search and rescue operations in the wilderness
(d) *
Development of and implementation of an operational plan for search and rescue
Organizations operating at trench and
excavation incidents shall meet all the requirements specified in Chapter 2 of
this standard.
The AHJ shall evaluate the effects of
severe weather, extremely hazardous trench or excavation situations, and other
difficult conditions to determine whether their present training program has
prepared the organization to operate safely.
Organizations operating at the
awareness level shall meet all requirements specified in Section 5-2 within
this standard, the requirements in Chapter 2 of NFPA 472, Standard for
Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents, and
the requirements of competent person as defined in Section 1-3 of this
standard.
Awareness-level functions at trench and
excavation emergencies shall include the following:
(a) *
Size-up of existing and potential conditions
(b) *
Identification of the resources necessary to conduct safe and effective trench
and excavation emergency operations
(c) *
Development and implementation of procedures for carrying out the emergency
response system for trench and excavation emergency incidents
(d) *
Development and implementation of procedures for carrying out site control and
scene management
(e) *
Recognition of general hazards associated with trench and excavation emergency
incidents and the procedures necessary to mitigate these hazards within the
general rescue area
(f) *
Recognition of typical trench and excavation collapse patterns, the reasons
trenches and excavations collapse, and the potential for secondary collapse
(g) *
Development and implementation of procedures for making a rapid, nonentry
extrication of noninjured or minimally injured victim(s)
(h) *
Recognition of the unique hazards associated with the weight of soil and its
associated entrapping characteristics
Organizations operating at the operations
level shall meet all requirements specified in Section 9-2. In addition,
members shall be capable of hazard recognition, equipment use, and techniques
necessary to operate safely and effectively at trench and excavation
emergencies, including the collapse or failure of individual, nonintersecting
trenches with an initial depth of 8 ft (2.44 m) or less where no severe
environmental conditions exist, digging operations do not involve supplemental
sheeting and shoring, and only traditional sheeting and shoring are used.
Organizations operating at the
operations level shall meet all requirements specified in Sections 4-3, 5-3,
and 6-3.
Operations-level functions at trench
and excavation emergencies shall include the following:
(a) Development
and implementation of procedures to make an entry into a trench or excavation
rescue area
(b) *
Recognition of unstable areas associated with trench and excavation emergencies
and adjacent structures
(c) *
Development and implementation of procedures to identify probable victim
locations and survivability
(d) *
Development and implementation of procedures for making the rescue area safe,
including the identification, construction, application, limitations, and
removal of traditional sheeting and shoring using tabulated data and approved
engineering practices
(e) *
Development and implementation of procedures for initiating a one-call utility
location service
(f) *
Identification of soil types using accepted visual or manual tests
(g) Development
and implementation of procedures to ventilate the trench or excavation space
(h) Identification
and recognition of a bell-bottom excavation (pier hole) and its associated
unique hazards
(i) Development
and implementation of procedures for placing ground pads and protecting the
“lip” of a trench or excavation
(j) *
Development and implementation procedures to provide entry and egress paths for
entry personnel
(k) *
Development and implementation procedures for conducting a pre-entry briefing
(l) *
Development and implementation procedures for record keeping and documentation
during entry operations
(m) *
Development and implementation of procedures for implementing and utilizing a
rapid intervention team (RIT) as specified in Section 6-5 of NFPA 1500, Standard
on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program
(n) Development
and implementation of procedures for the selection, utilization, and
application of shield systems
(o) *
Development and implementation of procedures for the selection, utilization,
and application of sloping and benching systems
(p) Identification
of the duties of panel teams, entry teams, and shoring teams
(q) Development
and implementation of procedures for assessing the mechanism of entrapment and
the method of victim removal
(r) *
Development and implementation of procedures for performing extrication
Organizations operating at the
technician level shall meet all requirements specified in Sections 9-2 and 9-3.
In addition, members shall be capable of hazard recognition, equipment use, and
techniques necessary to operate safely and effectively at trench and excavation
emergencies, including the collapse or failure of individual or intersecting
trenches with an initial depth of more than 8 ft (2.4 m) or where severe
environmental conditions exist, digging operations involve supplemental
sheeting and shoring, or manufactured trench boxes and/or isolation devices
would be used.
Organizations operating at the
technician level shall meet all requirements specified in Sections 5-4 and 6-4.
Technician-level functions at trench
and excavation emergencies shall include the development and implementation of
the following:
(a) *
Procedures for the identification, construction, application, limitations, and
removal of manufactured protective systems using tabulated data and approved
engineering practices
(b) *
Procedures to continuously, or at frequent intervals, monitor the atmosphere in
all parts of the trench to be entered. This monitoring shall be done, in the
following order, for oxygen content, flammability (LEL/LFL), and toxicity
(c) Procedures
for the identification, construction, application, limitations, and removal of
supplemental sheeting and shoring systems designed to create approved
protective systems
(d) Procedures
for the adjustment of protective systems based on digging operations and environmental
conditions
(e) *
Procedures for rigging and placement of isolation systems
The following documents or portions
thereof are referenced within this standard as mandatory requirements and shall
be considered part of the requirements of this standard. The edition indicated
for each referenced mandatory document is the current edition as of the date of
the NFPA issuance of this standard. Some of these mandatory documents might
also be referenced in this standard for specific informational purposes and,
therefore, are also listed in Appendix C.
National Fire Protection Association, 1
Batterymarch Park, P.O. Box 9101, Quincy, MA 02269-9101.
NFPA 472, Standard for Professional
Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents, 1997 edition.
NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire
Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, 1997 edition.
NFPA 1521, Standard for Fire
Department Safety Officer, 1997 edition.
NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire
Department Incident Management System, 1995 edition.
10-1.2.1 Fire Protection Publications Publication.
Fire Protection Publications, Oklahoma
State University, Stillwater, OK 74078.
Incident Command System, ISBN 0-87939-051-4, first edition, October 1983.
10-1.2.2 U.S. Government Publications.
U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC 20402.
Title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 1926, Subpart P, Appendix C.
Title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 1926.652 (c)(3) and (c)(4) (Shield Systems).
FEMA US&R Response System,
Appendix C (Task Force Search and Rescue Marking System, Building Marking
System, and Structure Marking System).
U.S. Department of Transportation, First
Responder Guidelines.
Appendix A is not a part of
the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational
purposes only. This appendix contains explanatory material, numbered to
correspond with the applicable text paragraphs.
This standard was developed to define
levels of preparation and operational capability that should be achieved by any
authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) that has responsibility for technical
rescue operations. These defined levels provide an outline for a system to
manage an incident efficiently and effectively in order to maximize personnel
safety, the successful rescue of victims, and the eventual termination of the
event.
The system should be followed to
increase the capabilities of the AHJ to deal successfully with even the most
complex incident. The system progresses from the simple basic awareness level,
to the operations level, and finally to the technician level. It should be
understood that, as the system expands, the requirements for training, operational
skills, management ability, and types and amounts of equipment also expand.
These requirements include rescue, fire
suppression, and emergency services including agencies such as fire
departments, law enforcement, emergency medical services, utility, public
works, and rescue organizations.
An organization can achieve its desired
level of operational capability through the use of external resources that
operate at the desired level of operational capability.
The National Fire Protection
Association does not approve, inspect, or certify any installations,
procedures, equipment, or materials; nor does it approve or evaluate testing laboratories.
In determining the acceptability of installations, procedures, equipment, or
materials, the authority having jurisdiction may base acceptance on compliance
with NFPA or other appropriate standards. In the absence of such standards,
said authority may require evidence of proper installation, procedure, or use.
The authority having jurisdiction may also refer to the listings or labeling
practices of an organization that is concerned with product evaluations and is
thus in a position to determine compliance with appropriate standards for the
current production of listed items.
This term can also be used to designate
rescue personnel assigned to perform the task of attendant during rescue
operations involving entry-type rescue. In this case the term rescue
attendant is used.
A-1-3 Authority Having Jurisdiction.
The phrase “authority having
jurisdiction” is used in NFPA documents in a broad manner, since jurisdictions
and approval agencies vary, as do their responsibilities. Where public safety
is primary, the authority having jurisdiction may be a federal, state, local,
or other regional department or individual such as a fire chief; fire marshal;
chief of a fire prevention bureau, labor department, or health department;
building official; electrical inspector; or others having statutory authority.
For insurance purposes, an insurance inspection department, rating bureau, or
other insurance company representative may be the authority having
jurisdiction. In many circumstances, the property owner or his or her
designated agent assumes the role of the authority having jurisdiction; at
government installations, the commanding officer or departmental official may
be the authority having jurisdiction.
This term can also be used to designate
rescue personnel assigned to perform the task of entry during rescue
operations. In this case, the term rescue entrant is used.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
Proper training and documentation of
training in the use of PPE is also necessary.
Self-Rescue. This escape method includes self-actuated methods (such as
climbing a ladder or crawling through a horizontal manway opening) as well as
those methods externally applied and operated (such as a hauling system
attached to the entrant and operated by the rescue team).
A small, and often harmless, avalanche is
called a “sluff.”
This method can be accomplished by a second
line in a raise or lowering system or by managing a single line with a friction
device in fixed-rope ascent or descent. Belays also protect personnel exposed
to the risk of falling who are not otherwise attached to the rope rescue
system.
This definition excludes mines and
caves or other natural formations, all of which must be addressed by other
specialized training and equipment.
A-1-3 Confined Space Rescue Team.
While six personnel provide the
recommended minimum for most entry-type confined space rescues, the committee
recognizes that some of these rescues will not require this number of
personnel. The number of personnel required to perform these rescues should be
based on the situation, hazards, and degree of difficulty of the situation
confronted.
A team is “qualified” by its capability
as a team, not by the individual qualifications of its members.
Cribbing can be combined and/or cut to
form “wedges” (incline-shaped timber) or “chocks” (stair-step-shaped timber).
An entry permit authorizes specific
employees to enter a confined space and contains specific information as
required.
In certain industries, U.S. federal law
does not require a permit system even though spaces meeting the characteristics
of confined spaces as defined within this standard might be present. In these
cases, as well as cases of unauthorized or nonregulated entry into confined
spaces, a permit might not be available for reference by the rescue team. The
space must be completely assessed before entry can be safely made. U.S. federal
law does not require rescuers to have a permit to rescue, although it is
advisable for the rescue team to follow similar procedures to ensure safety.
Examples include desert,
alpine/mountain, arctic, rain forest, and sea shore.
To facilitate the provision of federal
assistance, the Federal Response Plan breaks federal response into 12 functions
that are called emergency support functions or ESFs (ESF #9 is urban search and
rescue). The plan is applicable to natural disasters such as earthquakes,
hurricanes, typhoons, tornadoes, and volcanic eruptions; technological
emergencies involving radiological or hazardous material releases; and other
incidents requiring federal assistance under the Stafford Act.
It is designed to address the consequences of
any disaster or emergency situation in which there is a need for federal
response assistance under authority of the Stafford Act.
A-1-3 FEMA Task Force Search and Rescue Marking System.
Markings are made by drawing a 2 ft 2 ft “X” and denoting in each of the quadrants
of the “X” relevant search information (e.g., search status, findings, hazards
found, time and date of search, team involved). Figure A-3-2.2(i)(a)
illustrates the search marking system. For more information, see FEMA US&R
Response System.
A-1-3 FEMA Task Force Structure/Hazard Evaluation Marking System.
Markings are made by drawing a 2 ft 2 ft square box and denoting in and around the
box specific relevant hazard information (e.g., general level of operation
safety, direction of safest entry, time and date of search, hazards found, team
involved). Figure A-3-2.2(i)(b) illustrates the structure/hazard evaluation
marking system. For more information, see FEMA US&R Response System.
A-1-3 FEMA Task Force Structure Marking System, Structure Identification Within a Geographic Area.
The primary method of identification
includes the existing street name, hundred block, and building number.
Structure identification within a geographic area is used to differentiate
buildings by groups, such as by block(s) or by jurisdictional area. Figure
A-3-2.2(i)(c) illustrates the building ID and location marking system. For more
information see FEMA US&R Response System, Appendix C, “Task Force
Building Marking System.”
Flammables can be solids, liquids, or
gases that exhibit these qualities.
A-1-3 General Area (or Warm Zone).
Sometimes general area is generally
defined as the area 300 ft (90 m) in all directions from the incident site.
A-1-3(b) Hazardous Atmosphere for Confined Space.
Hazardous atmosphere for confined space
can be estimated by observing the density of the concentration. In general, if
the concentration of dust obscures vision at a distance of 5 ft (1.52 m) or
less, it could be within its flammable range.
The incident scene includes the entire area
subject to incident-related hazards and all areas used by incident personnel
and equipment in proximity to the incident.
A-1-3 Isolation System (or Isolation Devices).
Examples of isolation devices include
concrete or steel pipe, corrugated pipe, concrete vaults, or other
pre-engineered structures that sufficiently isolate and protect the victim.
Knots include bights, bends, and hitches.
A load test is generally performed by
multiple personnel to exert force on the system at the load attachment point in
the manner of function before life loading.
Usually a disconnect switch, circuit
breaker, valve, or other energy-isolating mechanism is used to hold equipment
in a safe position. However, this can include other means of keeping equipment
from being set in motion and endangering workers, including the use of guards
when other mechanisms are not available. The use of guards can violate federal
lockout/tagout regulations in federally regulated facilities. Lockout is
usually performed in combination with a tagout procedure.
Lowering systems should incorporate a
mechanism to prevent the uncontrolled descent of the load during the lowering
operation. This mechanism can reduce the need for excessive physical force to
control the lowering operation.
A-1-3 Mechanical Advantage (M/A).
Mechanical advantage usually expressed
in terms of a ratio of output force to input force. For example, a rope
mechanical advantage system that requires only 10 pounds of input force to
produce 30 pounds of output force has a 3:1 mechanical advantage (30 force
pounds to 10 force pounds, 3:1). Likewise, a system that requires 30 pounds of
input force to produce 30 pounds of output force has a 1:1 mechanical
advantage. There is no such thing as zero mechanical advantage. Other factors
can effect the efficiency of a mechanical advantage system including friction
and drag created by the equipment. For purposes of this document, these factors
are not considered and so the mechanical advantage is theoretical rather than
actual. Although others exist, rope-based mechanical advantage systems are most
practically classified as simple or compound.
A-1-3 Multipoint Anchor System (Load
Distributing Anchor System and Load Sharing Anchor System).
Both load distributing anchor systems
and load sharing anchor systems should be configured so as to limit the
resulting drop that occurs as the result of an anchor point failure.
A-1-3 National Search and Rescue Plan.
According to this plan, all maritime or
navigable water search and rescue (SAR) is the responsibility of the U.S. Coast
Guard, and all inland SAR is the responsibility of the U.S. Air Force.
A-1-3 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
PPE includes protective apparel (e.g.,
clothing, footwear, gloves, and headgear) as well as personal protective
devices (e.g., goggles, faceshields, hearing protectors, and respirators).
Adequate PPE should protect the respiratory system, skin, eyes, face, hands,
feet, body, and ears.
Protective systems include support systems,
sloping and benching systems, shield systems, and other systems that provide
the necessary protection.
Raising systems should incorporate a
mechanical means to prevent the load from falling should the primary control
mechanism be released during the raising operation.
A-1-3 Rapid Intervention Crew.
Rapid intervention crews should be
fully equipped with the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE),
protective clothing, and any specialized rescue equipment that might be needed
given the specifics of the operation under way.
A-1-3 Registered Professional Engineer.
However, a registered professional
engineer registered in any state is deemed to be a “registered professional
engineer” within the meaning of this standard when approving designs for
manufactured protective systems or tabulated data to be used in the
construction of protective systems.
A-1-3 Rescue Area (or Hot, Danger, or Collapse Zone).
Sometimes rescue area is generally
defined as an area 50 ft (15 m) in all directions from the incident site, or a
distance in all directions equal to the height of the structure involved in the
collapse plus a third.
The term timely is based on many
factors such as perceived danger of the original entry (e.g., possible supplied
breathing air required), distance to definitive medical care, capabilities of
responding emergency medical services, and so forth. In trauma-related
injuries, the “golden hour” principle can be used to determine how quickly the
rescue service should be able to respond in order to deliver the patient to the
appropriate treatment facility within an hour of onset of injuries. The rescue
service should have a goal of responding to these emergencies within 15 minutes
of the time they receive notification.
A-1-3 Retrieval Equipment (or Retrieval System).
In U.S. federally regulated industrial
facilities, these systems are required whenever an authorized entrant enters a
confined space unless the retrieval system would increase the overall risk of
entry or would not contribute to the rescue of the entrant. For confined space
rescue operations, these systems should be in place prior to entry (into
vertical or horizontal spaces) in such a manner that retrieval of rescue
entrants can begin immediately in the event of an emergency. Retrieval systems
can also be used to act as fall-arresting devices for rescue personnel.
Traditionally in search and rescue,
this analysis involves the assessment of the general status of the victim(s) in
order to apply the proper urgency to the situation (rescue versus body
recovery). A live victim suggests a rescue and its associated high level of
urgency. A deceased victim, however, is a body recovery that suggests a far
less urgent response.
A-1-3 Shield (or Shield System).
Shields can be permanent structures
that are designed to be portable and moved along. Shields can be either
manufactured or job-built in accordance with 29 CFR 1926.652 (c)(3) or
(c)(4). Shields used in trenches are usually referred to as “trench boxes” or
“trench shields.”
The angle of incline required to
prevent a cave-in varies with the differences in such factors as soil type,
environmental conditions of exposure, and application of surcharge loads. (See
also Angle of Repose.)
A-1-3 Supplemental Sheeting and Shoring.
Supplemental sheeting and shoring
requires additional training beyond that of traditional sheeting and shoring.
The system safety check should have the
following three components:
(a) Physical/Visual
Check. Personnel should carefully review all system components to ensure
proper assembly.
(b) Load
Test. Personnel should pre-load the system in a safe manner (e.g., standing
away from edges while pre-loading).
(c) Audible/Visual
Confirmation. A signal should be issued by the person performing the system
safety check following the first two steps that confirms their completion. The
signal should address other rescuers utilizing the system and should be
acknowledged by one or more of them.
The term is also applied to six tables
found in Appendix C of 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P.
A-1-3 Technical Rescue Incident.
Technical rescue incidents can include
water rescue, rope rescue, confined space rescue, wilderness search and rescue,
trench rescue, vehicle and machinery rescue, dive search and rescue, collapse
rescue, and other rescue operations requiring specialized training.
Examples include cliffs, steep slopes,
rivers, streams, valleys, fields, mountainside, and beach.
Examples include cliffs, caves, wells,
mines, avalanche, and rock slides.
A-1-3 Traditional Sheeting and Shoring.
Some newer style sheeting and shoring
might not require a strongback attachment (refer to manufacturer
recommendations).
A-1-3 Trench (or Trench Excavation).
In general, the depth is greater than
the width, but the width of a trench (measured at the bottom) is no greater
than 15 ft (4.6 m). If forms or other structures are installed or constructed
in an excavation so as to reduce the dimension measured from the forms or
structure to the side of the excavation to 15 ft (4.6 m) or less, the
excavation is also considered a trench.
A-1-3 Uprights (or Strongback).
Uprights placed so that the individual members
are closely spaced, in contact with, or interconnected to each other are
considered “sheeting.”
The wilderness often includes a
collection of various environments such as forests, mountains, deserts, natural
parks, animal refuges, rain forests, and so forth. Depending on terrain and
environmental factors, the wilderness can be as little as a few minutes into
the backcountry or less than a few feet off the roadway. Incidents with only a
short access time could require an extended evacuation and thus qualify as a
wilderness incident.
Safe operations at technical rescue
incidents should include the assessment and acquisition of external resources
required for situations beyond the operational capability of the organization.
An example might include a situation in a confined space or trench requiring a
technician-level hazardous materials response capability.
BLS is the minimum level of medical care
required; advanced life support (ALS) is recommended. The AHJ should consider
the development of an advanced capability in medical response to reflect the
needs of the technical rescue environment.
The AHJ, in addition to BLS training,
should provide training in the treatment of the following medical conditions:
(a) Cervical/Spinal
Immobilization. Training should be integrated with systems for vertical and
horizontal patient evacuations (e.g., patient packaged onto a stokes stretcher
and secured to provide spinal immobilization).
(b) Crush
Injury Syndrome. Training should include recognition, evaluation, and
treatment, prior to extrication, of victims with symptoms or mechanism of
injury potential.
(c) Amputation.
Amputation should be considered as a last resort, but rescuers should be aware
of the possibility. Incident managers also should be aware of the proper
procedures to be followed in their community, including interaction with local
medical doctors.
(d) Infection
Control. Training should include education in protective equipment (e.g.,
gloves, masks, PPE), protective procedures (e.g., avoiding contaminants and
pollutants), and appropriate decontamination following possible exposures, as
specified in NFPA 1581, Standard on Fire Department Infection Control
Program, or in OSHA’s “Blood-Borne Pathogens” standard (29 CFR
1910.1030).
(e) Critical
Incident Stress. Training should include information on personal
well-being, with emphasis on preconditioning, pacing of effort, proper diet and
rest, and emotional and psychological diversions during long-term operations.
Personnel should be trained to recognize the signs and symptoms of critical
incident stress. Scene managers should be trained in the value of
rehabilitation efforts during extended operations for the safety and continued
efficiency of their personnel.
This documentation shall contain each
recipients name, the signatures or initials of the trainers, the dates of
training, an outline of the training conducted, and resource materials used to
develop the training.
Legal considerations impact on many
phases of a technical rescue incident (e.g., confined space regulations,
use/maintenance of SCBA, right of entry laws during a search, right to privacy
laws during an investigation). Whatever the capacity in which a rescuer
functions (public or private), it is important that the rescuer be informed
regarding all relevant legal restrictions, requirements, obligations, standards,
and duties. Failure to do so could jeopardize the reliability of any
investigation or operation and could subject the rescuer to civil liability or
criminal prosecution.
A hazard and risk assessment is an evaluation
and analysis of the environment and physical factors influencing the scope,
frequency, and magnitude of technical rescue incidents and the impact and
influence they can have on the ability of the AHJ to respond to and safely
operate at these incidents.
The goal and terminal objectives of the
hazard and risk assessment are to increase the awareness of the AHJ and to
provide a focus toward conditions and factors associated with potential
technical rescue responses.
The hazard and risk assessment can be
associated closely with similar functional and format methodology, as might be
incorporated in a master plan or strategic deployment study. It is not the
intent of this standard to encumber the AHJ in its undertaking of a detailed
and extensive analysis of each technical rescue environment within the
jurisdiction, but this standard is meant to be a document that provides means
for a deliberate and objective examination of common or unique factors that can
be identified, correlated, or highlighted to aid in the development of
technical rescue capabilities and to determine their necessary level of
expertise in order to provide risk reduction.
As part of the risk assessment, the AHJ
should identify the types of internal resources immediately available, within
the operational structure of the organization, that could be utilized for
technical rescue incident response. The resources should include the
availability of personnel; training levels of personnel; professional specialty
or trade skills; and type, quantity, and location of equipment, appliances, and
tools applicable to technical rescue incident response.
The research and documentation of
available external resources that can augment the internal capabilities of the
AHJ form a crucial component in its overall ability to respond and operate at
technical rescue incidents.
Due to the potential complexity of
related technical rescue incidents and the variety of conditions and factors
that can exist at site-specific or large-scale incidents, external resource
allocation and deployment becomes a necessity in order to support the search
and rescue function. The AHJ can develop a comprehensive list of those
resources that can aid the responding agency by first identifying those factors
that currently can limit its overall response capability by using the hazard
and risk assessment evaluation. Once limitations or resource deficiencies are
identified, the AHJ can develop a resource database by reviewing those firms or
businesses that are located within the jurisdiction. The telephone directory
for the jurisdiction is an excellent reference that provides general categories
and listing headings for companies, firms, and agencies that can become sources
for resource allocation.
The identification of area needs can be
associated with four general categories. These include, but are not limited to,
the following:
(a) Technical
services
(b) Equipment
(c) Supplies
(d) Services
In addition, the AHJ should identify
and contact local professional societies, associations, and trade groups that
can become excellent sources for technical support and resource development.
Such professional groups include the
following:
(a) American
Institute of Architects (AIA)
(b) American
Society of Consulting Engineers (ASCE)
(c) Association
of Building Contractors (ABC)
(d) Local
or regional builders exchange
(e) Construction
Specification Institute (CSI)
(f) American
Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE)
(g) American
Public Works Association (APWA)
(h) Association
of General Contractors (AGC)
(i) International
Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers
(j) National
Association of Demolition Contractors
The development of a community resource
directory based upon these contacts documents and makes readily available the
variety of resources that might be needed in the event of a technical rescue
incident. The community resource directory should include information on each
firm, company, or agency appearing in the directory. A profile of the
specialized resource(s) available, along with contact person(s) information,
including telephone numbers for both home and work, also should be included.
Although the compiled data can be
entered and stored on a computer database, a binder or book-formatted system
should be used to adapt easily for field use. The use of lap-top computer
notebooks with disk-formatted data can also prove useful, and consideration
should be given to the longevity and portability provided by battery packs.
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) should
be developed that outlines specifications for equipment and resource
allocation, availability of services and procedures for procurement, and
subsequent financial reimbursement for services or equipment supplied.
In addition to the types of resources
previously identified, the AHJ also should consider the development of a
resource guide for the procurement of technical services from individuals
associated with specific groups or agencies. This resource guide could include
profiles of personnel, such as canine handlers, search dogs, technical rescue
specialists, industrial hygienists, riggers, and so forth, who, on an on-call
basis, could respond and augment on-scene resources.
The AHJ should not disregard resource
acquisition requests to agencies and groups outside the immediate boundaries of
the jurisdiction. Regional, statewide, and national resource identification
could be developed based on the overall projected needs identified by
evaluation of the hazard and risk assessment.
Depending on the size and magnitude of
the on-scene incident, resource availability might not be adequate for incident
logistical needs, or the resources might be affected by whatever caused the
incident, especially where a large area within the jurisdiction is part of the
overall incident conditions. Such could be the case in an earthquake,
hurricane, flooding, or other large-scale natural disaster.
Regional, multistate, or national
deployment of specialized rescue teams or task forces should be considered in
the development of the overall resource directory in order to provide
additional capabilities as incident conditions and incident magnitude necessitate.
The intent of this provision is to
establish procedures to enable the incident commander to obtain the necessary
resources to augment the internal capabilities of the AHJ. These resources can
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) Mutual
aid agreements
(b) Agreements
with the private sector, including the following:
1. Organizations specializing in the specific skills and/or
equipment required to resolve the incident
2. Special equipment supply companies
3. Related technical specialists
4. Communications
5. Food service
6. Sanitation
(c) Memorandums
of Agreement (MOA) with other public, state, or federal agencies
Specific specialized equipment that
might be required for safe technical rescue operations includes the following:
(a) Supplied
line breathing apparatus (SLBA), supplied air breathing apparatus (SABA), and
supplied air respirator (SAR), all of which should meet the requirements of 29 CFR
1910.146, “Permit-Required Confined Spaces”
(b) Personal
alert safety system (PASS), which should meet the requirements of NFPA 1500, Standard
on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, and NFPA 1982, Standard
on Personal Alert Safety Systems (PASS)
(c) Life
safety ropes and system components, which should meet the requirements of NFPA
1500 and NFPA 1983, Standard on Fire Service Life Safety Rope and System
Components
(d) Communications
equipment, which should meet the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.146
(e) Lighting
equipment (e.g., flashlights, helmet-mounted lamps), which should be, depending
on the situation, intrinsically safe or explosion proof as defined by 29 CFR
1910.146
The AHJ should evaluate the
appropriateness of the equipment at an emergency incident with regard to the
existing hazards.
Depending on local conditions, divers
should consider the use of compressed gas air (CGA) Grade E air.
BLS is the minimum level required; ALS
is recommended.
Interagency cooperation is essential to
the successful mitigation of many technical rescue incidents. Personnel from
fire, rescue, EMS, and law enforcement can be involved in an operation at all
levels, from recognition through command. It is recommended that all agencies
involved in rescue review and/or develop policies regarding control of
firearms. In the end, some emergency responders called to the scene of an
incident can be armed. The complete exclusion of firearms might not always be
practical and/or feasible on the incident scene but is generally recommended.
Some organizations use helmets, helmet
appliques, or vests with fluorescent retro reflective material to readily
identify the safety officer(s). Where the safety officer is not trained to the
level at which the organization is operating, a member of the organization with
discipline-specific technical expertise should be appointed to serve as an
assistant safety officer.
The incident management system utilized
at all technical rescue incidents should be structured to address the unique
groups, divisions, or branches that can be necessary to effectively manage the
specific type of incident (e.g., structural collapse, trench/excavation
cave-in).
Managing external influences such as
family, news media, and political entities includes instructing subordinates in
how to deal with them should they be encountered.
NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire
Department Incident Management System, in 3-2.2.1, describes the use of an
information officer (a member of the command staff) to address these types of
influences. Where encounters with family, news media, or political influences
are likely, such a function should be filled as soon as possible.
The AHJ should address the possibility
of members of the organization having physical and/or psychological disorders
(e.g., physical disabilities, fear of heights, fear of enclosed spaces) that
can impair their ability to perform rescue in a specific environment.
In all types of structural collapse
rescue incidents, the potential exists for extenuating circumstances that would
require expertise beyond the normal capability of the organization to safely
operate. Examples of these situations include, but are not limited to, multiple
collapse sites, large number of victims, numerous deeply buried victims,
multiple complications (e.g., both deeply buried victims and multiple sites),
involvement of hazardous/toxic substances, or severe environmental conditions
(e.g., snow and rain). These conditions should be evaluated during the initial
risk assessment and on an incident-by-incident basis.
The size-up should include, but not be
limited to, the initial and continuous evaluation of the following:
(a) Scope
and magnitude of the incident
(b) Risk
and benefit analysis
(c) Number
and size of structures affected
(d) Integrity
and stability of structures affected
(e) Occupancy
types (e.g., residential, mercantile)
(f) Number
of known and potential victims
(g) Access
to the scene
(h) Environmental
factors
(i) Available
and necessary resources
The intent of this provision is to
establish procedures to enable the incident commander to obtain the necessary
resources to augment the internal capabilities of the AHJ. These resources can
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) Mutual
aid agreements
(b) Agreements
with the private sector, including the following:
1. Construction industry
2. Demolition industry
3. Heavy equipment operators
4. Special equipment supply companies
5. Hardware, lumber, and construction suppliers
6. Consulting engineers and architects
7. Related technical specialists
8. Communications
9. Food service
10. Sanitation
(c) Memorandums
of Agreement (MOA) with other public, state, or federal agencies
The emergency response system includes,
but is not limited to, operations- and technician-level personnel, as well as
local, state, and federal resources.
These procedures should include the
process of achieving and maintaining control of the site and the perimeter.
This might include management of all civilian and nonemergency personnel and
establishment of operational zones and site security.
General hazards associated with search
and rescue operations at structural collapses can present the AHJ with uniquely
challenging situations. The AHJ should consider the following potential hazards
when providing training to its members.
(a) Utilities.
Control of the utilities in and around a structural collapse is critical to
ensure the safety of responding personnel and victims. The AHJ should provide
its members with training in the control of these services in order to provide
a safe environment in which to operate and to ensure the safety of victims. The
following utilities should be considered when providing training:
1. Electrical services (primary and secondary)
2. Gas, propane, fuel oil, or other alternative energy sources
(primary systems)
3. Water
4. Sanitary systems
5. Communications
6. Secondary service systems (i.e., compressed, medical, or
industrial gases)
(b) Hazardous
Materials. Collapsed structures might include various materials unique to
an occupancy that, when released during a structural collapse, could pose a
hazard to victims and responders. The AHJ should provide members with training
in the recognition of potential hazardous materials releases, the determination
of an existing hazard, and the methods used to contain, confine, or divert
hazardous materials in order to conduct operations safely and effectively.
(c) Personal
Hazards. At the site of any structural collapse, there are many dangers
that pose personal injury hazards to the responders. The AHJ should train
members to recognize the personal hazards they encounter and to use the methods
needed to mitigate these hazards in order to help ensure their safety. Every
member should be made aware of hazards such as trips, falls, blows, punctures,
impalement, and so forth.
(d) Confined
Space. Some structural collapses necessitate a confined space rescue.
Responding personnel should be familiar with and trained in confined space
rescue requirements and techniques. The AHJ should determine the applicable
laws and standards related to confined space rescue and should provide training
to members in confined space rescue.
(e) Other
Hazards. There are numerous other hazards associated with structural
collapses. The AHJ should make every effort to identify the hazards that might
be encountered within the jurisdiction and should provide members with training
and awareness of these other hazards in order to perform rescue operations
safely and effectively.
Hazard recognition training should
include the following as a minimum:
(a) Recognition
of building materials and structural components associated with light-frame
ordinary construction
(b) Recognition
of unstable collapse and failure zones of light-frame ordinary construction
(c) Recognition
of collapse patterns and probable victim locations associated with light-frame
ordinary construction
Four Categories of Building
Construction.
The construction categories, types, and
occupancy usage of various structures might necessitate the utilization of a
variety of different techniques and material. The four construction categories
that the rescuer most likely will encounter in collapse situations are
light-frame, heavy wall, heavy floor, and precast concrete construction. These
four categories usually comprise the majority of structures affected by a collapse.
(a) Light-Frame
Construction.
1. Materials used for light-frame construction are generally
lightweight and provide a high degree of structural flexibility in response to
forces such as earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados, and so forth.
2. These structures typically are constructed with skeletal
structural frame systems of wood or light-gauge steel components that provide
support to the floor and roof assemblies.
3. Examples of this construction type include wood frame
structures used for residential, multiple low-rise, and light commercial
occupancies up to four stories in height. Light-gauge steel frame buildings
include commercial, business, and light manufacturing occupancies and
facilities.
(b) Heavy
Wall Construction.
1. Materials used for heavy wall construction are generally heavy
and utilize an interdependent structural or monolithic system. These types of
materials and their assemblies tend to produce a structural system that is
inherently rigid.
2. This construction type usually is built without a skeletal
structural frame. It utilizes a heavy wall support and assembly system that
provides support for the floors and roof areas.
3. Occupancies utilizing tilt-up concrete construction are
typically one to three stories in height and consist of multiple, monolithic
concrete wall panel assemblies. They also use an interdependent girder, column,
and beam system for providing lateral wall support of floor and roof
assemblies. Such occupancies typically include commercial, mercantile, and industrial
usage. Materials other than concrete now are being utilized in tilt-up
construction.
4. Examples of this type of construction include reinforced and
unreinforced masonry buildings typically of low-rise construction, one to six
stories in height, and of any occupancy type.
(c) Heavy
Floor Construction.
1. Structures of heavy floor construction are built utilizing
cast-in-place concrete construction consisting of flat slab panel, waffle, or
two-way concrete slab assemblies. Pretensioned or post-tensioned reinforcing
steel rebar or cable systems are common components used for structural
integrity. The vertical structural supports include integrated concrete
columns, concrete enclosed steel frame, or steel frame, which carry the load of
all floor and roof assemblies. This type of structure includes heavy timber
construction that might use steel rods for reinforcement.
2. The reinforcing steel along with the varying thicknesses of
concrete structural slab and girder supports utilized in this construction assembly
pose significant concerns with respect to breaching and void penetration.
3. The loss of reinforcement capability and the integrity of
structural loading capacity of the floor and wall assemblies create significant
safety and operational considerations during collapse operations.
4. Structural steel frame construction utilizes a skeletal framing
system consisting of large-load-carrying girders, beams, and columns for
structural support. These components represent a substantial weight factor for
individual and assembly components. Floor systems consist of cast-in-place
concrete slabs of varying thicknesses poured onto metal pan or structural metal
floor decks and also might include precast and post-tensioned concrete plank
systems. These concrete/metal pan floor assemblies are supported by the
structural steel framing system.
5. The exterior construction might consist of metal or masonry
veneer, curtain wall, or composite material panel systems. Additionally,
precast concrete or stone-clad panel systems might be present.
6. Multiple assembly or component failures might be present in a
collapse situation where isolated or multiple collapse conditions or collapse
configurations exist.
7. Examples of this type of construction include offices, schools,
apartments, hospitals, parking structures, and multipurpose facilities. Heights
vary from single-story to high-rise structures.
(d) Precast
Construction.
1. Structures of precast construction are built utilizing modular
precast concrete components that include floors, walls, columns, and other
subcomponents that are field-connected at the site.
2. Individual concrete components utilize imbedded steel
reinforcing rods and welded wire mesh for structural integrity and might
utilize either steel beam and column or concrete framing systems for the
overall structural assembly and building enclosure.
3. These structures rely on single or multipoint connections for
floor and wall enclosure assembly and are a safety and operational concern
during collapse operations.
4. Examples of this type of construction include commercial,
mercantile, office, and multiuse or multifunction structures, including parking
structures and large occupancy facilities.
Table A-3-2.2(e) lists the four
model construction codes and standards commonly adopted within the United
States and is provided to aid the AHJ in identifying the relationship of NFPA
1670 construction/collapse types to their applicable code. These model codes
are referenced to classification Types I through V as specified in NFPA 220, Standard
on Types of Building Construction.
Table A-3-2.2(e) Fire-Resistive Building Types
|
Reference |
Fire-Resistive1 |
Noncombustible1 |
Ordinary1 |
Heavy Timber1 |
Wood1 |
|||||
|
NFPA 2202,3 |
Type I |
Type II |
Type III |
Type IV |
Type V |
|||||
|
|
443 |
332 |
222 |
111 |
000 |
211 |
200 |
2HH |
111 |
000 |
|
BOCA4 |
Type I |
Type II |
Type III |
Type IV |
Type V |
|||||
|
|
1A |
1B |
2A |
2B |
2C |
3A |
3B |
4 |
5A |
5B |
|
UBC5 |
Type I |
Type II |
Type III |
Type IV |
Type V |
|||||
|
|
P |
P |
P |
NP |
P |
NP |
|
P |
NP |
|
|
SBC6 |
Type I |
Type II |
Type IV |
Type V |
Type III |
Type VI |
||||
|
|
433 |
332 |
P |
NP |
P |
NP |
2HH |
P |
NP |
|
|
1 The table headings for fire-resistive,
noncombustible, ordinary, heavy timber, and wood construction do not
represent any special construction code classification but are meant to
provide an easily recognizable general construction type reference. 2 See NFPA 220, Standard
on Types of Building Construction, for common definitions of
construction Types I through V. 3 The three-digit
arabic numbers that appear beneath each construction type heading designate
the fire resistance rating requirements for certain structural elements
specified in NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction.
They are provided in this table as a reference and to indicate their
relationship to each type of construction. 4 Construction
types are referenced to the BOCA National Building Code for
correlation with fire-resistive rating requirements for each construction
type. 5 Construction
types are referenced to UBC, Uniform Building Code. The designations
P and NP stand for “protected” and “not protected,” respectively, as used
within the UBC. 6 Construction
types are referenced to SBC, Standard Building Code. The designations
P (protected) and NP (not protected) are used in order to provide
correlation with Uniform Building Code information. |
||||||||||
Figure A-3-2.2(e) Construction code classifications by building type.
Figure A-3-2.2(e) is intended to
identify construction/collapse types according to the classifications of NFPA
220, Standard on Types of Building Construction, and is not part of any
fire-resistive or fire rating/assembly requirement. In this table, the NFPA
1670 construction/collapse types are referenced to NFPA 220 to allow rapid
correlation of construction code classification with the associated
construction/collapse type. Depending upon occupancy, usage, and actual size of
the structure, some construction code classifications can exhibit
characteristics of other than specifically correlated construction/collapse
types.
Collapse patterns and potential victim
locations include the following:
(a) Lean-to.
A lean-to is formed when one or more of the supporting walls or floor joists
breaks or separates at one end, causing one end of the floor(s) to rest on the
lower floor(s) or collapse debris. Potential areas where victims might be
located are under the suspended floor and on top of the floor at the lowest
level. [See Figure A-3-2.2(f)(a).]
Figure A-3-2.2(f)(a)
Lean-to floor collapse. (Courtesy of
U.S. Department of Civil Defense)
(b) V.
A “V” is formed when heavy loads cause the floor(s) to collapse near the
center. Potential areas where victims might be located are under the two
suspended floor pieces and on top of the floor in the middle of the V. [See
Figure A-3-2.2(f)(b).]
Figure A-3-2.2(f)(b)
V-shape floor collapse. (Courtesy of U.S. Department of Civil Defense)
(c) Pancake.
A pancake is formed when the bearing wall(s) or column(s) fails completely and
an upper floor(s) drops onto a lower floor(s), causing it to collapse in a
similar manner. Potential areas where victims might be located are under the
floors and in voids formed by building contents and debris wedged between the
floors. [See Figure A-3-2.2(f)(c).]
Figure A-3-2.2(f)(c)
Pancake floor collapse. (Courtesy of U.S. Department of Civil Defense)
(d) Cantilever.
A cantilever is formed when one end of the floor(s) hangs free because one or
more walls have failed and the other end of the floor(s) is still attached to
the wall(s). Potential areas where victims might be located are on top of or
under the floors. [See Figure A-3-2.2(f)(d).]
Figure A-3-2.2(f)(d)
Cantilever floor collapse. (Courtesy of U.S. Department of Civil Defense)
(e) A-frame.
An A-frame occurs when flooring separates from the exterior bearing walls but
still is supported by one or more interior bearing walls or nonbearing
partitions. The highest survival rate for trapped victims will be near the
interior partitioning. Other victims will be located in the debris near both
exterior walls. [See Figure A-3-2.2(f)(e).]
Figure A-3-2.2(f)(e) A-frame floor collapse.
Indications of potential for secondary
collapse include the following:
(a) Leaning
walls
(b) Smoke
or water seeping through joints
(c) Unusual
sounds (e.g., creaking, groaning)
(d) Recurring
aftershocks
(e) Sagging
floor or roof assemblies
(f) Missing,
strained, or damaged points of connection of structural elements
(g) Excessive
loading of structural elements
(h) Sliding
plaster and airborne dust
(i) Separating
walls
(j) Lack
of water runoff
(k) Racked
or twisted structure
(l) Building
vibration
Procedures for conducting searches
should include, at a minimum, visual and verbal methods.
Search and rescue operations in the
structural collapse environment should include close interaction of all
incident management system elements for safe and effective victim extrications.
Search operations for locating victims should be initiated early at a
structural collapse incident. Structural collapse search operations should
conform to an accepted system for victim search strategy and tactics in order
to achieve optimum performance and effectiveness. The following recommendations
provide current tactical capabilities and general strategies that can assist
personnel in productive search operations.
Structural collapse operations are one
of the most difficult rescue situations likely to be encountered. Depending on
the complexity of the search and rescue activity, personnel might need to spend
large amounts of precious time on small numbers of difficult rescues. It is
important to establish whether or not rescue personnel are involved with a live
victim, since time should not be wasted in such unproductive missions as the
removal of dead bodies while live victims might be saved.
Structure/hazards evaluation and search
assessment procedures are designed to identify specific information pertinent
to each affected building. Either of these analyses can be completed
independently of the other, although the structure/hazards evaluation normally
is completed first. Symbols should be drawn conspicuously with orange spray
paint. (See FEMA US&R Response System, Appendix C, “Task Force Building
Marking System.”)
One of the initial strategic concerns
for personnel is the need to analyze the structure(s) involved in any collapse
situation. This is especially true where there is more than one structure
involved, as in cases of devastating earthquakes, hurricanes, or other natural
or man-made disasters. The determination of the condition of the structure, hazards,
and occupancy prior to the event will affect the overall search and rescue
strategy.
It is imperative that the information
derived from a coordinated building triage and marking system be consolidated
by the AHJ at any structural collapse event. This information not only should
be used to identify operational priorities but also should be forwarded to the
incident commander to assist in the overall assessment of the event.
(a) FEMA
Task Force Search and Rescue Marking System. Distinct markings should be
made within the four quadrants of an “X” to denote clearly the search status
and findings during the search. Figure A-3-2.2(i)(a) illustrates the search
marking system.
An “X” measuring 2 ft 2 ft (0.6 m 0.6 m) should be spray-painted in the color
orange. The information for each quadrant should be written in the quadrant
using carpenter’s chalk or a lumber crayon.
In addition, search personnel
should mark the exact location of a victim(s) with orange spray paint.
Surveyor’s tape can be used as a flag to identify the appropriate area in
conjunction with the spray paint. To reduce needless duplication of search
efforts, markings should be made at each point of entry or separate area of the
structure. Where updated information of previously searched structures is
needed, the old information should be crossed out and the most recent
information should be indicated below or next to the old, using the marking
system.
Figure A-3-2.2(i)(a) FEMA task force search and rescue marking system.
(b) FEMA
Task Force Building Marking System (Structure/Hazard Evaluation). This
system is designed to identify specific hazards associated with any collapsed
structure. Personnel should be cognizant of the nationally accepted marking
system and should be proficient in the use of the system. (See FEMA US&R
Response System, Appendix D, “Structure Triage, Assessment & Marking
System.”)
After performing a building hazard
assessment, the responder uses international orange spray paint to make a 2 ft 2 ft square box on the building adjacent to
the most accessible point of entry. Figure A-3-2.2(i)(b) illustrates the search
marking system.
An empty box indicates the building
is relatively safe for search and rescue operations and that damage is such that
there is little danger of further collapse. One diagonal line in the box
indicates the structure is significantly damaged and that some areas may need
shoring, bracing, or removal of hazards in spite of the fact that some areas
may be safe. Two diagonal lines in the box (an “X”) indicate that the building
is not safe for search and rescue operations and may be subject to sudden
collapse. An arrow next to the marking box indicates the direction of safest
entry to the structure. To the right of the marking box, text is used to
indicate the time and date of the search, the team designation, and hazard(s)
found. The letters HM to the right of the box (in the text area) indicate a
hazmat condition in or adjacent to the structure. When HM is used, search and rescue
operations normally will not be allowed until the condition is better defined
or eliminated.
Figure A-3-2.2(i)(b) Task force building marking system structure/hazard evaluation.
(c) FEMA
Task Force Structure Marking System (Structure Identification Within a
Geographical Area). Structure identification within a geographic area is
used to differentiate buildings by groups, such as by block(s) or
jurisdictional area. This geographic area identification should be consolidated
at the command post of the AHJ and used to deploy search and rescue personnel. [See
Figure A-3-2.2(i)(c).]
International orange spray paint is
used to mark buildings with their street number so that personnel can
differentiate one building from another. Existing numbers should be used to
fill in any unknown numbers. If all numbers are unknown, arbitrary numbers can
be used (odd and even used on opposite sides of the street). The primary method
of identification should include the existing street name, hundred block, and
building number. Such identification is not always possible due to
post-disaster conditions. (See FEMA US&R Response System, Appendix D,
“Structure Triage, Assessment & Marking System.”)
A standard approach to describing
each building’s layout is also used. The street side of the building is side
one. Subsequent sides (2, 3, 4) are labeled in a clockwise direction around the
building. Internally, quadrants are described starting with the front left
corner (while standing at the front, street side of the building) and labeled
with letters starting with “A.” Subsequent quadrants (B, C, D, E) are labeled
in a clockwise direction around the interior of the building with the core
(center) being labeled “E.” Stories are labeled 1, 2, 3, and so forth, and
basements are designated B1, B2, B3, and so forth.
It is imperative that personnel
clearly identify each structure within a geographic area. This identification
will assist both in the specific ongoing search and rescue effort and the
long-term, post-disaster identification of the site. [See Figure
A-3-2.2(i)(d).]
Figure A-3-2.2(i)(c) Task force structure marking system structure identification within a geographic area.
Figure A-3-2.2(i)(d) Task force structure marking system structure identification within a geographic area — single structure.
Operations personnel should be capable
of obtaining and utilizing one or more of the following resources:
(a) Structural
collapse search dogs
(b) Search
cameras
(c) Acoustic/seismic
instruments (listening devices)
(d) Thermal
imaging (infrared) devices
(e) Other
technical search devices
Search operations should incorporate a
variety of technical and nontechnical methods that might provide personnel with
the only viable method to locate victims and determine their status.
The AHJ should identify as many forms
of technical and nontechnical search capabilities available at the local,
regional, state, or national level that are commensurate with its needs. In
addition to the basic operational level of capability, search methods should
include, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) Structural
Collapse Search Dogs. This involves the use of air-scent dog and handler
teams trained and equipped to specifically search collapsed structures. The dog
and handler work as a team to identify the location and status of victims
buried beneath rubble or structural components. It is important that the AHJ
differentiate between structural collapse search dogs and other “air-scenting”
dogs such as those used to search for drugs and explosives, cadaver dogs, and
police K-9.
(b) Electronic
Search. This involves the use of acoustic/seismic devices and includes the
deployment of an array of two or more pickup probes around the perimeter of a
collapsed structure or void area.
(c) Search
Cameras. This involves the placement of a search camera device within a
void area to search “visually” a previously nonvisible collapse zone. To use
this device, ancillary tools such as rotary hammers, drills, or breakers are
needed to create an opening through which the camera can be passed.
(d) Air
Sampling. Identification of high concentrations of CO2,
for example, might indicate the presence of a live victim.
Once the AHJ has identified the
location and the availability of these search options, a system should be
developed to place them into operation at a structural collapse incident.
In conjunction with the capability of
the AHJ to place into operation one or more of the previously described search
methods, personnel should implement a strategic and tactical plan for the use
of these devices as quickly as possible. Personnel should coordinate all
available and viable tactical capabilities into a logical plan of operation.
It is essential that the AHJ employ
every possible search method to ensure that its members are able to locate
viable victims before committing rescue resources to any prolonged (although
well-intentioned) operation.
Access training shall include, but
shall not be limited to, the following:
(a) Techniques
to lift safely and effectively structural components of walls, floors, or roofs
(b) Shoring
techniques to safely and effectively construct temporary structures needed to
stabilize and support structural components to prevent movement of walls,
floors, or roofs
(c) Breaching
techniques to safely and effectively create openings in structural components
of walls, floors, or roofs
(d) Operation
of appropriate tools and equipment to accomplish the above tasks safely and
effectively
Extrication operations at a structural
collapse incident necessitate a coordinated effort that includes search,
rescue, and medical capabilities. Personnel should have a working knowledge of
general extrication tactics and procedures. These tactics and procedures should
be flexible enough to address the specific situation and problems encountered.
The AHJ should provide the appropriate training and equipment necessary to
complete an extrication operation safely and effectively. These should include
the following:
(a) Manual.
Training should be provided in safe lifting techniques necessary to move
manageable sections of debris and interior contents displaced by partial or
complete structural collapse.
(b) Hand
Tools. Tools and training necessary to move debris, room contents, and
structural components displaced by partial or complete structural collapse
should be provided. Hand tools should include, but not be limited to, pry bars,
bolt cutters, jacks, and sledge hammers. Training requirements should be
coordinated with the hand tool inventory.
Extrication training should include the
following, as a minimum:
(a) Packaging
victims within confined areas
(b) Removing
victims from elevated or below-grade areas
(c) Providing
initial medical treatment to victims
(d) Operating
appropriate tools and equipment to accomplish the above tasks safely and
effectively
See A-3-3.3(b).
Generally in concrete tilt-up,
reinforced concrete, and steel construction, locating and extricating victims
is more complicated than in light-frame, ordinary construction or reinforced
and unreinforced masonry construction. As structural components, materials, and
weights increase, the ability to breach, stabilize, and operate within such a
structural collapse becomes more hazardous, complicated, and time consuming.
The overall ability of the AHJ to
function safely and effectively is greatly dependent upon the prompt
availability of appropriate tools, equipment, and supplies to accomplish
operations.
In concrete tilt-up, reinforced
concrete, and steel construction, personnel should understand that the tools
needed change depending on the type of structure involved. Structural collapse
incidents involving these categories of construction necessitate the use of
tools and equipment specifically designed for these materials, including the
following:
(a) Masonry
saws and blades
(b) Rotary
hammers and breakers
(c) Air
bags
(d) Dump
trucks and front-end loaders
(e) Concrete
saws and blades
(f) Pneumatic
and hydraulic drills, hammers, and breakers
(g) Cranes
(h) Burning
and cutting equipment such as oxyacetylene and exothermic or plasma cutters
(i) Bolting
and anchoring systems
Power tools (e.g., air bags, hydraulic
spreaders and rams, and power saws) and training necessary to breach, cut,
bore, and lift structural components displaced by partial or total structural
collapse should be provided.
See A-3-3.3(d).
In all types of technical rescue
incidents, the potential exists for extenuating circumstances that would
require expertise beyond the normal capability of the organization to safely
operate. Examples of these situations include lowering and raising operations
requiring significant obstacle negotiation, descending or ascending operations
from extreme heights, or severe environmental conditions (e.g., snow and rain).
These conditions should be evaluated during the initial risk assessment and on
an incident-by-incident basis.
The size-up should include, but not be
limited to, the initial and continuous evaluation of the following:
(a) Scope,
magnitude, and nature of the incident
(b) Location
and number of victims
(c) Risk
versus benefit analysis (body recovery versus rescue)
(d) Access
to the scene
(e) Environmental
factors
(f) Available/necessary
resources
(g) Patient
contact when it can be performed without endangering either responders or victims
See A-3-2.2(b).
The emergency response system includes,
but is not limited to, operations- and technician-level personnel, as well as
local, state, and federal resources.
These procedures should include the
process of achieving and maintaining control of the site and the perimeter.
This process might include management of all civilian and nonemergency
personnel and establishment of operational zones and site security.
General hazards associated with rope
rescue operations can present the AHJ with uniquely challenging situations. The
AHJ should consider the following potential hazards when providing training to
its members.
(a) Fall
Hazards. Rope rescue incidents are often required in areas where elevation
differential exists. Therefore, the possibility of someone falling, or
something falling on someone, should always be considered and mitigated.
(b) Other
Hazards. There are numerous other hazards associated with rope rescue
operations. The AHJ should make every effort to identify the hazards that might
be encountered within the jurisdiction and should provide members with training
and awareness of these other hazards in order to perform rescue operations
safely and effectively.
The “general area” around a rope rescue
scene is the entire area within 300 ft (91.44 m) (or more, as established by
the incident commander). Making the general area safe includes, but is not
necessarily limited to, the following:
(a) Controlling/limiting
traffic and sources of vibration in the area, including shutting down all
vehicles and equipment
(b) Controlling/limiting
access to the area by unnecessary personnel
(c) Identifying
hazards and removing and/or reducing their impact
Other than that described in 2-4.2,
specific PPE necessary for safe rope rescue operations can include, but not be
limited to, the following:
(a) Harnesses
(b) Gloves
appropriate for rope rescue work
(c) Helmets
designed for climbing and rope rescue work
An “anchor system” includes, if
necessary, an appropriate and proper backup.
Anchor systems can include, but are not
limited to, the use of portable anchor systems (either improvised or
commercial) such as A-frames, bipods, tripods, pickets, and gin poles.
The skills and procedures required to
select, construct, and use a lowering system vary greatly depending on
environmental factors and elevation differential (height). Therefore, rescuers
should be trained to perform these procedures under the environmental (e.g.,
snow, darkness, wind) and elevation (e.g., potential height) conditions.
Rescuers should be able to identify a
tied knot. Specific knots, hitches, and bends that can be useful include the
following:
(a) Bowline
(b) Figure-eight
family of knots and bends
(c) Grapevine
or double fisherman’s knot
(d) Water
knot
(e) Barrel
knot
(f) Any
knots, hitches, or bends used by the organization
Safety procedures should include, as a
minimum, the following:
(a) Edge
protection
(b) Belays
(c) Critical
angles in rope systems
(d) System
stresses
(e) Safety
checks
(f) Other
safety assurances
A counter-balance system is a type of
raising system (see definitions in Chapter 1).
See A-4-3.2(j).
In all types of confined space rescue
incidents, the potential exists for extenuating circumstances that would
require expertise beyond the normal capability of the organization to safely
operate. Examples of these situations can include, but are not limited to, deep
or isolated spaces, multiple complicating hazards (e.g., water, chemicals, and
extreme height in a space), failure of essential equipment, or severe
environmental conditions (e.g., snow and rain). These conditions should be
evaluated during the initial risk assessment and on an incident-by-incident
basis.
While much of this chapter applies to
confined space rescue in industrial settings, it is intended for all incidents
involving confined spaces as defined within this standard.
The size-up should include, but not be
limited to, the initial and continuous evaluation of the following:
(a) Scope,
magnitude, and nature of the incident
(b) Location,
number, and condition of victims
(c) Risk
versus benefit analysis (body recovery versus rescue)
(d) Access
to the scene
(e) Environmental
factors
(f) Available/necessary
resources
(g) Establishment
of control perimeter
A site safety plan can also provide
useful information for consideration during size-up and should include the
following:
(a) Rescue
team notification
(b) Acceptable
entry conditions for rescue
(c) Hazard
analysis
(d) Risk
analysis of hazards
(e) Site
map
(f) Hazard
abatement (including control zones, ventilation, and lockout/tagout procedures)
(g) Use
of buddy system (when applicable)
(h) Communications
(e.g., site, rescue attendant to rescue entrant)
(i) Command
post
(j) Incident
management organizational chart
(k) Standard
operating guidelines
(l) Safe
work practices
(m) Medical
assistance
(n) Pre-entry
safety briefings
(o) Pre-/post-entry
physicals (if indicated)
Hazards can include, but are not
limited to, the following:
(a) Hazardous
atmospheres
(b) Hazardous
chemicals
(c) Temperature
extremes
Some methods of recognition and assessment
of hazards associated with confined spaces include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(a) Assessment
of the perimeter surrounding the confined space incident to determine the
presence of or potential for a hazardous condition that could pose a risk to
rescuers during approach
(b) Recognition
of the need for decontamination of a patient or responder who might have been
exposed to a hazardous material as per NFPA 471, Recommended Practice for
Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents, NFPA 472, Standard for
Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents, and
29 CFR 1910.120, U.S. Federal OSHA Standard on Hazardous Waste
Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER).
(c) Recognition
of the need for a confined space rescue service or additional resources when
nonentry retrieval is not possible
(d) Notification
of the designated rescue service and other resources necessary for initiation
of confined space rescue
(e) Recognition
of hazardous atmospheres or materials through visual assessment and information
received from on-site personnel
The term confined space as
defined within this standard is synonymous with the term permit-required
confined space or permit space used by many U.S. federally regulated
agencies.
Retrieval includes the operation of
common nonentry retrieval systems. Examples include simple winch and block
devices used in conjunction with tripods, quadpods, or other manufactured
portable anchor systems. A nonentry retrieval can simply involve operating the
crank on a winch/tripod system when anchors and protection systems are already
in place.
The emergency response system includes,
but is not limited to, operations- and technician-level personnel, as well as
necessary local, state, and federal resources. In addition, the system includes
procurement of on-site information resources such as witnesses, industrial entry
supervisors, industrial facility managers, engineers, or other responsible
persons. Printed on-site information resources available at many U.S. federally
regulated industrial facilities can include, but is not limited to, the
following:
(a) Entry
permit
(b) Material
safety data sheets (MSDS)
(c) Other
site work permits
These procedures should include the
process of achieving and maintaining control of the site and the perimeter.
This process might include management of all civilian and nonemergency
personnel and establishment of operational zones and site security. The
organization should also assure through written standard operating guidelines
that the scene is rendered safe at the termination of the incident.
Specific procedures for mitigating
hazards at confined space rescue can include, but are certainly not limited to,
consideration of the following:
(a) Personal
protective equipment (PPE)
(b) Fall
protection
(c) Harnesses
(d) Lockout/tagout
procedures
(e) Hazard
assessment
(f) Scene
assessment
Procedures to perform a confined space
hazard assessment include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) Identification
of the important industrial documentation, where available, useful in hazard
assessment. This includes entry permits, lockout/tagout procedures and
checklists, and hot work permits.
(b) Selection
of all applicable information necessary for emergency responders from a
material safety data sheet (MSDS).
(c) PPE
for the hazard as per NFPA 472, Standard for Professional Competence of
Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents, and 29 CFR 1910.120, U.S.
Federal OSHA Standard on Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER).
Procedures to perform a scene
assessment in order to determine the magnitude of the problem in terms of life
safety can include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) The
type, size, access, and internal configuration of the confined space
(b) Information
regarding current and potential hazards that threaten victims and rescuers
(c) A
risk versus benefit analysis concerning the threat to rescuers in relation to
the viability of victims
Figure A-5-3.3(a) shows predefined
of confined spaces normally found in an industrial setting. Classifying spaces
by “types” can be used to prepare a rescue training plan to include
representative permit spaces for practicing rescue operations as specified by
OSHA. These types focus mainly on the OSHA-specified criteria of opening size, configuration,
and accessibility. Another important factor to consider is the internal
configuration (congested or noncongested) of the permit required confined
space.
The following are definitions for
types of confined spaces normally found in an industrial setting, as shown in
Figure A-5-3.3(a).
(a) Diagonal
Portal. Plane of manway or portal is at an angle (between perpendicular and
parallel to the ground). To be considered as a vertical entry/horizontal
portal.
(b) Elevated
Portal. Bottom of passageway is 4 ft (1.22 m) or higher from ground level.
(c) Horizontal
Entry. Access passageway is entered traveling parallel to ground level
through a vertical portal.
(d) Manway
or Portal. An internal or external opening large enough for a person to
pass through.
(e) Rectangular/Square
Portal. A four-sided opening with four right angles. Opening size is
determined by measuring the shortest side of the opening.
(f) Rounded/Oval
Portal. A circular or elliptical opening; also any polygon not having
exactly four sides. Opening size is determined by measuring the smallest inside
diameter.
(g) Vertical
Entry. Access passageway is entered traveling perpendicular to ground level
through a horizontal portal.
Figure A-5-3.3(a) Confined space types for rescue training purposes.
The assessment at this level should
include, but not be limited to, the initial and continuous evaluation of the
following:
(a) Hazards
such as engulfment potential, environmental (e.g., chemical, atmospheric,
temperature), harmful forms of energy (e.g., electrical, mechanical, movement
due to gravity, hydraulic), configuration hazards (e.g., diverging walls,
entrapment, obstructions, trip/fall hazards), and so forth
(b) Risk
versus benefit analysis (body recovery versus rescue)
(c) Available/necessary
additional resources
(d) Establishment
of control zones
(e) Magnitude
of the hazard and isolation procedures
(f) Effectiveness
of the nonentry or qualifying entry-type rescue
(g) Overall
safety of rescue operations
(h) Level
of rescue response (appropriate for the type of rescue being attempted)
(i) Current
and projected status of the planned response
(j) Personnel
accountability
The AHJ should address the possibility
of members of the organization having physical and/or psychological disorders
(e.g., physical disabilities, fear of heights, fear of enclosed spaces) that
could impair their ability to perform rescue in confined spaces.
Roles, functions, and responsibilities
for these team positions should be consistent with the organization’s standard
operating guidelines for confined space rescue.
Personnel meeting the requirements of
NFPA 472, Standard for Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous
Materials Incidents, should perform the monitoring procedures even if such
personnel are not part of the rescue team.
Monitoring the atmosphere can include
the following considerations:
(a) Acceptable
limits for oxygen concentration in air should be between 19.5 percent and 23.5
percent. An oxygen-enriched atmosphere is considered to be greater than 23.5
percent and poses a flammability hazard. An oxygen deficient atmosphere is
considered to be lower than 19.5 percent and can lead to asphyxiation without
fresh-air breathing apparatus.
(b) Flammability
is measured as a percentage of a material’s lower explosive limit (LEL) or
lower flammable limit (LFL). Rescuers should not enter confined spaces
containing atmospheres greater than 10 percent of a material’s LEL regardless
of the personal protective equipment worn. There is no adequate protection for
an explosion within a confined space.
(c) Acceptable
toxicity levels are specific to the hazardous material involved, and chemical
properties should be assessed to determine the level of the hazard for a given
environment and time frame.
The confined space rescue team at the
operations level should have available resources capable of understanding the
assessment tools necessary for analysis and identification of hazardous
conditions within confined spaces and interpretation of that data. This
capability should include at least the following:
(a) Identification
of the hazards found within confined spaces and understanding how those hazards
influence victim viability and rescue/recovery operations
(b) Selection
and use of monitoring equipment to assess the following hazards:
1. Oxygen-deficient atmospheres
2. Oxygen-enriched atmospheres
3. Flammable environments
4. Toxic exposures
5. Radioactive exposures
6. Corrosive exposures
(c) Understanding
of the limiting factors associated with the selection and use of the
atmospheric and chemical monitoring equipment provided by the AHJ for confined
space emergencies. This equipment could include, but is not limited to, the
following:
1. Calorimetric tubes
2. Oxygen concentration monitor (continuous reading, remote
sampling)
3. Combustible gas monitor (continuous reading, remote sampling)
4. Specific toxicity monitor (continuous reading, remote sampling)
5. Multigas atmospheric monitors (continuous reading, remote
sampling)
6. Passive dosimeter
7. pH papers, pH meters, and pH strips
8. Radiation detection instruments
The factors given in 1 through 8
include, but are not limited to, calibration, proper operation, response time,
detection range, relative response, sensitivity, selectivity, inherent safety,
environmental conditions, and nature of hazard.
(d) Utilization
and evaluation of reference terms and resources to include, but not be limited
to, the following:
1. Lethal concentration-50 (LC-50)
2. Lethal dose-50 (LD-50)
3. Permissible exposure limit (PEL)
4. Threshold limit value (TLV)
5. Threshold limit value-short term exposure limit (TLV-STEL)
6. Threshold limit value-time weighted average (TLV-TWA)
7. Immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH)
8. Material safety data sheets
9. Reference manuals
10. Computerized reference databases
11. Technical information centers
12. Technical information specialists
13. Monitoring equipment
The intent of this paragraph is to
restrict entries made by operations-level organizations to those that would
absolutely minimize risk to rescue entrants. It is the intent of this document
that operations-level teams not perform hazardous entries.
The intention of this paragraph is to
limit the danger of entanglement.
The intention of this paragraph is to
ensure that the attendant can maintain direct observation of the entrants at
all times, making recognition of problems more rapid.
The intention of this paragraph is to
allow for easier retrieval of rescue entrants should this become necessary and
to provide for passage through the opening without removal of necessary
personal protective equipment, including fresh-air breathing apparatus.
The intention of this paragraph is to
allow a “buddy system” to be employed, providing potentially faster response to
a problem with one of the rescue entrants.
The intention of this paragraph is to
ensure that hazards to rescuers in organizations at this level are kept to an
absolute minimum.
Packaging devices that can be used in
confined spaces include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) Full
spine immobilization devices
(b) Short
spine immobilization devices
(c) Cervical
spine immobilization devices
(d) Litters
(e) Prefabricated
full-body harnesses
(f) Tied
full-body harnesses
(g) Wrist
loops (wristlets)
Guidelines for initial response
planning within the quantity and capability of available personnel and
equipment should include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) Response
objectives for confined space emergencies
(b) Nonentry
rescue options
(c) Entry-type
rescue options
(d) Determination
of whether rescuer and equipment capabilities are appropriate for available
rescue options
(e) Needs
analysis and procedures for providing emergency decontamination to victims
suspected of being contaminated with a hazardous material
[See Figure A-5-3.3(i).]
Figure A-5-3.3(i) Confined space rescue preplan.
Operational procedures for response
implementation should include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) Scene
control procedures including control zones and communication
(b) Incident
management system consistent with the organization’s standard operating
procedure
(c) Nonentry
retrieval
(d) Qualifying
entry-type rescues
(e) Emergency
decontamination as needed
(f) Technical-level
rescue service assistance
Organizations at the operations level
are expected to safely apply lowering and raising systems (rope or nonrope
based) as appropriate during confined space emergencies. These applications can
involve the use of rope rescue systems in the high-angle environment to both
lower rescuers into and remove rescuers and victims from confined spaces. The
determination of what systems are most appropriate to accomplish these tasks
should be dictated by the circumstances surrounding the incident.
The size-up/assessment at this level
should include, but not be limited to, the initial and continuous evaluation of
the following:
(a) Available/necessary
additional resources
(b) Hazard
isolation and control requirements.
Procedures should be consistent with
local, state, and federal guidelines such as those found in 29 CFR
1910.120, U.S. Federal OSHA Standard on Hazardous Waste Operations and
Emergency Response (HAZWOPER).
Planning response for entry-type
rescues with hazards should consider the following issues:
(a) Options
for entry-type confined space rescues beyond the capability of operations-level
personnel
(b) Selection,
use, maintenance, and training relative to personal protective clothing and
equipment provided by the AHJ for operating in and around confined space
emergencies
(c) Determination
of response objectives based on circumstances of the confined space emergency.
The response objective can involve any one of the following:
1. Victim rescue
2. Victim recovery
3. Remote extrication
4. Nonintervention
(d) Verification
of the need for emergency decontamination
(e) Development
of a plan of action, including safety considerations, consistent with the
organization’s standard operating guidelines, for entry-type confined space
rescue. Components of a typical action plan might include the following:
1. Site assessment
2. Confined space assessment
3. Resource organization and accountability (IMS)
4. Perimeters and control zones
5. Hazard evaluation
6. A comprehensive risk/benefit analysis that evaluates the
viability of the victim
7. Personal protective equipment
8. Chemical protective clothing
9. Specialized rescue equipment
10. Rescue/recovery objectives
11. On-scene work assignments
12. Communications procedures
13. Emergency decontamination procedures (victim)
14. Decontamination procedures (rescuers)
15. On-scene safety and health procedures including personnel health
monitoring, on-scene rehabilitation, emergency medical care procedures, and the
designation of a safety officer
16. Scene termination procedures
(f) Implementation
of the planned response to successfully rescue or recover victims from confined
spaces by completing the following tasks:
1. Perform the duties of an assigned position within the local
incident management system (IMS)
2. Perform entry-type rescues from confined spaces
3. Perform support functions for entry-type rescues from confined
spaces
4. Don, safely operate, and doff appropriate personal protective
clothing including, but not limited to, liquid splash protection and vapor
protective clothing, which might be required when operating around the scene of
confined space emergencies involving hazardous materials
(g) Development
of procedures that include required equipment and safety precautions for the
following entry-type confined space rescues:
1. Vertical rescue
2. Horizontal rescue
3. Suspended victim rescue
4. Entrapped or engulfed victim (collapse, particulate matter,
etc.)
See 5-4.2(c).
It is the intent of this provision that
the AHJ, as part of the hazard analysis and risk assessment, identify the types
of vehicles and machinery within their response area. These types can include,
but are not limited to, cars, trucks, buses, trains, mass transit systems, aircraft,
watercraft, agriculture implements, industrial/construction machinery, and
elevators/escalators. The AHJ should develop procedures and provide training to
personnel that is commensurate with the potential for rescue situations
involving the above-mentioned vehicles and machinery.
In all types of vehicle and machinery
rescue incidents, the potential exists for extenuating circumstances that would
require expertise beyond the normal capability of the organization to safely
operate. Examples of these situations can include, but are not limited to,
complex and/or unusual machinery, unusual vehicles, unusual locations of either
machinery or vehicles, multiple complicating hazards (e.g., water, chemicals,
and extreme height), failure of essential equipment, or severe environmental
conditions (e.g., snow and rain). These conditions should be evaluated during
the initial risk assessment and on an incident-by-incident basis.
The size-up should include, but not be
limited to, the initial and continuous evaluation of the following:
(a) Scope
and magnitude of the incident
(b) Risk/benefit
analysis (body recovery versus rescue)
(c) Number/size
of vehicles and/or machines affected
(d) Integrity
and stability of vehicles and/or machines affected
(e) Number
of known/potential victims
(f) Access
to the scene
(g) Hazards
such as disrupted or exposed utilities, standing or flowing water, mechanical,
hazardous materials, electrical, and explosives
(h) Exposure
to traffic
(i) Environmental
factors
(j) Available/necessary
resources
See A-2-2.5.
The emergency response system includes,
but is not limited to, operations- and technician-level personnel, as well as
local, state, and federal resources.
These procedures should include the
process of achieving and maintaining control of the site and the perimeter.
This might include management of all civilian and nonemergency personnel and
establishment of operational zones and site security.
General hazards associated with rescue
operations at vehicle and/or machinery rescue incidents can present the AHJ
with uniquely challenging situations. The AHJ should consider the following
potential hazards when providing training to its members.
(a) Utilities.
Control of the utilities in and around a vehicle and/or machinery rescue
incident is critical to ensure the safety of responding personnel and victims.
The AHJ should provide its members with training in the control of these
services in order to provide a safe environment in which to operate and to
ensure the safety of victims. The following utilities should be considered when
providing training:
1. Electrical services (primary and secondary)
2. Gas, propane, fuel oil, or other alternative energy sources (primary
systems)
3. Water
4. Sanitary systems
5. Communications
6. Secondary service systems (such as compressed, medical, or
industrial gases)
(b) Hazardous
Materials. Vehicle and/or machinery rescue incidents might include various
materials that, when released during an incident, could pose a hazard to
victims and responders. The AHJ should provide members with training in the
recognition of potential hazardous material releases, the determination of an
existing hazard, and the methods used to contain, confine, or divert hazardous
materials in order to conduct operations safely and effectively.
(c) Personal
Hazards. At the site of any vehicle and/or machinery rescue incident, there
are many dangers that pose personal injury hazards to the responders. The AHJ
should train members to recognize the personal hazards they encounter and to
use the methods needed to mitigate these hazards in order to help ensure their
safety. Every member should be made aware of hazards such as trips, falls,
blows, cuts, abrasions, punctures, impalement, and so forth.
(d) Movement
of Vehicle(s) and/or Machinery. Uncontrolled movement of vehicle(s) and/or
machinery components can cause extremely hazardous and potentially fatal
situations. Responding personnel should be familiar with and trained in
techniques for stabilizing and removing the potential for movement of
vehicle(s) and/or machinery components.
(e) Release
of High-Pressure Systems. Vehicles and machinery often include
high-pressure systems (e.g., hydraulic, pneumatic) that can fail without
warning. Such failure can cause extremely hazardous conditions, injury, and
death of victims and responders. The AHJ should provide members with training
in the recognition of potential high-pressure system hazards, the determination
of an existing hazard, and the methods used to contain, confine, or divert such
hazards in order to conduct operations safely and effectively.
(f) Other
Hazards. There are numerous other hazards associated with vehicle and/or
machinery rescue incidents. The AHJ should make every effort to identify the
hazards that might be encountered within the jurisdiction and should provide
members with training and awareness of these other hazards in order to perform
rescue operations safely and effectively.
The rescue area is that area
immediately surrounding [within a 20-ft (6.10 m), or so, radius] the vehicle
and/or machinery. Making the rescue area safe includes, but is not limited to,
the following actions; however, specific actions should be based on the
vehicle/machinery type and specific situation.
(a) Establishing
operational zones (i.e., hot, warm, cold) and site security
(b) Utilizing
specific techniques and tools (including cribbing, chocks, and wedges) to
stabilize the vehicle
(c) Utilizing
specific techniques and tools (i.e., lockout and tagout) to isolate the
involved equipment
(d) Making
the rescue area (i.e., hot zone) safe for entry
(e) Safely
undertaking disentanglement and/or extrication operations using hand tools
(f) Ventilating
the rescue area and monitoring its atmosphere when necessary
(g) Supporting
any unbroken utilities
(h) Providing
protective equipment for any victims, if possible, when necessary
(i) Prohibiting
entry into an unsafe vehicle and/or machinery rescue area
(j) Preventing
the touching or operating of equipment or machinery involved until its safety
has been established
In order to perform a safe
disentanglement and/or extrication operation, the AHJ should provide training
on the following topics:
(a) Types
of passenger restraint systems
(b) Frame
and construction features of vehicles
(c) Types
of suspension systems in vehicles
(d) Types
and classification of impacts
(e) Categories
of mechanical injury
(f) Various
stabilization techniques
(g) Center
of gravity and its relationship to rollover
(h) Use
of cribbing and chocks
(i) Building
a crib box
(j) Types
and examples of levers for mechanical advantage
(k) Proper
and effective use of hand tools including a hammer, pry bar, hack saw, glass
punch, Halligan, knife/belt cutter, cable cutter, and come-a-long
(l) Disentanglement
through primary access points
(m) Patient
packaging prior to removal from a vehicle and/or machine
(n) Protection
of the victim during extrication and/or disentanglement operations
These procedures refer to the
mitigation and management of the hazards identified in A-6-2.2(e).
In order to perform a safe
disentanglement and/or extrication operation from large/heavy vehicles and/or
machines, the AHJ shall provide training on the following topics:
(a) Frame
and construction features of heavy/large vehicles and machinery
(b) Use
and components of a rescue chain assembly
(c) Pneumatic
high-, medium-, and low-pressure lifting bags
(d) Use,
care, and maintenance of wire rope and its associated equipment
(e) Large
and heavy object weight estimation
(f) Steps
necessary to lift and/or move large objects
(g) Use
of cribbing and chocks with large and heavy objects
(h) Use
of commercial heavy wreckers and recovery services to assist at incidents
involving large transportation vehicles
(i) Use,
care, and maintenance of both manual and power winches
(j) Types
and examples of lifting devices that use mechanical advantage principles
(k) Proper
and effective use of power tools including hydraulic, pneumatic, and electrical
spreading, cutting, lifting, and ram-type tools
(l) Disentanglement
through both primary and secondary access points through the use of available
power tools
(m) Protection
of the victim during this type of extrication and/or disentanglement operations
(n) Lockout/tagout
of machinery
(o) Identification
and use of various sling configurations
“Unusual” situations include, but are
not limited to, extrication and/or disentanglement operations at incidents
involving cars on their tops, cars on their sides, and cars on top of other
cars, trucks, and large commercial vehicles.
“Advanced stabilization” includes
techniques using chains, cables, jack devices, and cribbing/shoring to
stabilize vehicles of any size.
Power tools (e.g., air bags, hydraulic
spreaders and rams, hand tools, and power tools) and training necessary to
remove, cut, and move components displaced at a vehicle and/or machinery rescue
incident should be provided.
“Specialized rescue equipment” can
include, but is not limited to, hydraulic, pneumatic, and electrical spreading,
cutting, lifting, and ram-type tools immediately available and in use by the
organization.
In all types of water incidents, the
potential exists for extenuating circumstances that would require expertise
beyond the normal capability of the organization to safely operate. Examples of
these situations include, but are not limited to, depth, current, water
movement, water temperature extremes, or severe environmental conditions (e.g.,
snow and rain). These conditions should be evaluated during the initial risk
assessment and on an incident-by-incident basis.
The assessment phase includes size-up [see
A-7-2.2(b)] as well as an evaluation of the subject’s condition and the
subject’s ability to assist in his or her own rescue.
Consideration should be given to the
need for dive rescue early in the size-up/assessment phase. The best intended
surface rescue can eventually require dive capability.
The size-up should include, but not be
limited to, the initial and continuous evaluation of the following:
(a) Scope,
magnitude, and nature of the incident
(b) Location
and number of victims
(c) Risk/benefit
analysis
(d) Separation,
isolation, security, and interviewing of witnesses
(e) Hazards
such as disrupted or exposed utilities, standing or flowing water, mechanical,
hazmat, and explosives
(f) Access
to the scene
(g) Environmental
factors
(h) Resource
assessment, internal and external
(i) Rescue
verses recovery
See A-2-2.5.
The emergency response system includes,
but is not limited to, operations- and technician-level personnel, as well as
local, state, and federal resources.
These procedures should include the
process of achieving and maintaining control of the site and the perimeter.
This might include management of all civilian and nonemergency personnel and
establishment of operational zones and site security.
General hazards associated with water
search and rescue operations can present the AHJ with uniquely challenging
situations. The AHJ should consider the following potential hazards when
providing training to its members.
(a) Utilities.
Control of the utilities in and around a water incident is critical to ensure
the safety of responding personnel and victims. The AHJ should provide its
members with training in the control of these services in order to provide a
safe environment in which to operate and to ensure the safety of victims. The
following utilities should be considered when providing training:
1. Electrical services (primary and secondary)
2. Gas, propane, fuel oil, or other alternative energy sources
(primary systems)
3. Water/steam
4. Sanitary systems
5. Communications
6. Secondary service systems (such as compressed, medical, or
industrial gases)
(b) Hazardous
Materials. Water incident sites might include various materials unique to a
site that, when released during a rescue, could pose a hazard to victims and
responders. The AHJ should provide members with training in the recognition of
potential hazardous material releases, the determination of an existing hazard,
and the methods used to contain, confine, or divert hazardous materials in
order to conduct operations safely and effectively.
(c) Personal
Hazards. At the site of any water incident, there are many dangers that
pose personal injury hazards to the responders. The AHJ should train members to
recognize the personal hazards they encounter and to use the methods needed to
mitigate these hazards in order to help ensure their safety. Every member
should be made aware of hazards such as trips, falls, blows, punctures,
impalement, and so forth.
(d) Confined
Space. Some water incident sites necessitate a confined space rescue.
Responding personnel should be familiar with and trained in confined space
rescue requirements and techniques. The AHJ should determine the applicable
laws and standards related to confined space rescue and should provide training
to members in confined space rescue.
(e) Hazards
That Are Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health. These hazards include
swift water with currents exceeding that which a person or watercraft can
safely and effectively operate.
(f) Other
Hazards. There are numerous other hazards associated with water rescues.
The AHJ should make every effort to identify the hazards that might be
encountered within the jurisdiction and should provide members with training
and awareness of these other hazards in order to perform rescue operations
safely and effectively.
(g) General
Area. The general area around a water incident site is the entire area
around a rescue site. Any member operating within the vicinity of the water’s
edge can accidentally enter the hazard zone. PPE should be utilized
accordingly. Making the general area safe includes, but is not necessarily
limited to, the following:
1. Controlling/limiting access to the area by unnecessary
personnel
2. Identifying hazards and removing and/or reducing their impact
3. Utilizing personal flotation devices (PFDs) and other PPE
Certain jurisdictions might not need to
achieve operational capability in one or more specialties. The organization should
have the option of selecting those specialties relevant to needs identified in
the risk assessment and hazard analysis.
Further requirements of PPE are
included in 2-4.2 of this standard. This requirement applies to all the
described disciplines.
It is important to note that
fire-related PPE such as fire helmets and boots are not typically appropriate
for water rescue work and in some cases actually pose a hazard.
These procedures include, but are not
limited to, assuring the wearing of proper PPE, procedural checklists, site
security (keep bystanders back), reviewing the operational plan (and one’s
place in the plan), reviewing communications procedures (rescuer to tender,
tender to shore, rescuer to rescuer), reviewing emergency procedures, proper
attire for the potential weather, reviewing procedures for equipment handling,
and assuring proper rest and attitude for the operation.
Water rescue requires a combination of
knowledge, skills, abilities, physical fitness, and judgement to expect
positive outcomes. These things are to be gained through a combination of
training and experience.
Hazards to both victim and rescuer
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) Holes
(b) Strainers
(c) Hydraulics
(d) Low
head dams
(e) Debris
(f) Cold
water
(g) Currents
(h) Undercuts
(i) Backwash
(j) Outwash
(k) Contamination
(l) Obstructions
(m) Turbidity
Mechanisms of entrapment include, but
are not limited to, the following:
(a) Undercuts
(b) Underwater
hazards
(c) Strainers
(d) Hydraulics
It is important for the organization to
have the capability to continuously evaluate the effectiveness of the chosen
plan of action. If the initial plan is not working, or requires modification to
ensure safety or effectiveness, the plan should be changed. The potential for
“tunnel vision” (a narrow focus excluding important influences) should be
considered by those running the operation.
Shore-based rescues include, but are
not limited to, reaching to a victim, throwing something to a victim (e.g.,
rope, buoy), and talking a victim into self-rescue.
Many readily available items found on
shore can be used to reach to a victim in the water while not exposing the
rescuer to undue risk. Important aspects of reaching techniques include body
position and reaching device selection (i.e., anything that can be used to
extend a rescuer’s reach).
Many items (e.g., throw bag, PFD, ring
buoy, manufactured floatation or rope-throwing devices) found on shore can be
thrown to a victim and used either as flotation or to pull the victim to shore.
The accurate use of throw bags takes
practice and knowledge of proper body position, throwing technique, rope
retrieval technique, and target selection (e.g., upstream in moving water,
slightly beyond the victim).
Members of organizations at the
operations level should have the ability to assist other rescue personnel with
the construction of rope rescue systems. Skills involved in supplying this
assistance include, but are not limited to, equipment identification, knot-tying
capability, and limited knowledge of how the applicable rope rescue equipment
should be used.
Procedures for survival swimming and
self-rescue are important because a rescuer might find him- or herself
unintentionally in the water. These procedures should include, but are not
limited to, the ability to float and swim with and without floatation, the
ability to conserve body heat while immersed in water (heat escape lessening
position), the ability to use one’s clothing for floatation, and the ability to
remove one’s self from the water by climbing into a boat, exiting at shore, or
exiting from a pool’s edge.
Environmental conditions like weather
and temperature play an important role in a rescuer’s safety and comfort. Cold
temperatures can lead to hypothermia and/or local cold injuries that can
seriously impair a rescuer’s ability to think and act. Wetness, through
perspiration or from the environment, can substantially increase the speed at
which a rescuer becomes affected by cold. Therefore, thermal protection from
the elements is essential for safe operations in cold and wet environments.
It is also very important to note that
all environments can lead to heat stress as well. For example, much of the
apparel designed for rescue operations serves to protect the rescuer from heat
loss and wet by being waterproof and insulating its wearer from the ambient
environment. Unfortunately, a side effect of such garments is the serious
impairment of the body’s most effective means of thermal regulation: the
evaporation of perspiration from the skin. In all environments and conditions,
rescuers wearing proper PPE will require great attention to the substantial
potential for thermal stress (e.g., overheating). Pre-operation physical exams,
appropriate hydration/nutrition, and monitored rehabilitation are essential for
safe operations and healthy personnel.
The regular use of an approved form for
the collection and transfer of this information is recommended.
Boat-based operations include, but are
not limited to, the capability to perform surface support operations from
within a boat while in surf, on the water, or on ice (whichever is applicable).
Accessible victims are those who can be
retrieved without the rescuer having to venture out onto the ice or into the
water.
Hazards associated with dive operations
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) Barotrauma
(decompression sickness, nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity, etc.)
(b) Drowning
(c) Hyperventilation,
hypercarbia, and other respiratory problems
(d) Anxiety
reactions
(e) Fatigue
and exhaustion
(f) Dehydration
(electrolyte imbalances)
(g) Heat
stress (i.e., heat exhaustion, stroke, and cramps)
(h) The
combination of prescription medication or smoking and diving
(i) Pre-existing
medical conditions or injuries
(j) Hypothermia
Surface support personnel are called
upon to assist technicians in preparing to dive, dress, and equip divers;
provide search pattern control and direction; monitor divers’ time, depth, dive
profile, and air supply; and provide a communication link to the surface via
electronic communication equipment or manual rope pull signals.
Surface support personnel should be
capable of recognizing, maintaining, and operating all surface support
equipment used by the organization.
Unusual or extreme environmental
conditions can require very specialized dive and/or surface support training
specific to the situation(s) encountered. (See A-7-4.7.1 for some specialty
examples.)
Hazards associated with ice rescue
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) Hypothermia
(b) Localized
cold injuries (i.e., frostbite, frostnip)
(c) Thermal
burns from heating devices
Rescuers should be able to recognize
and describe the implication of the following ice and water characteristics:
(a) New
(frazil) ice
(b) Candle
ice
(c) Old
(rotten) ice
(d) Clear
(hard) ice
(e) Milk
ice
(f) The
depth of ice and how it relates to carrying capacity
(g) Water
currents and how they relate to ice thickness
(h) Obstacles
and how they relate to current and ice formation
(i) Salt
water and ice formation (i.e., sea ice)
Surface support personnel should be
capable of recognizing, maintaining, and operating all surface support
equipment used by the organization.
One component of hypothermia that
should be emphasized to cold weather rescuers is the effects of cold
weather/water on a victim"s ability to help themselves, respond to
instructions from rescuers, or assist in his or her rescue.
Surf hazards include, but are not
limited to, the following:
(a) Riptides
(b) Undertows
(c) Currents
(d) Tides
(e) Obstructions
(f) Debris
(g) Cold
water
(h) Contamination
See A-7-3.5(j).
The ability to assess moving water is
important for safe operations. Examples of water characteristics and features
that should be identifiable include eddies, downstream/upstream “V”s, standing
waves, laminar/helical flows, confluence, cushion/pillows, and swift water
classifications.
A tag line is a line stretched across a
river and brought to the level of a stationary victim. A floating tag line has
a floatation device attached to the line to keep the rope on the surface of the
water and to provide something for the victim to grasp. A snag line is a
variation of the tag line that is weighted to reach an object beneath the
surface of the water. A tension diagonal, or zip line, is a line positioned at
an angle greater than 45 degrees diagonal to the water’s flow and just above
the surface of moving water, anchored at both ends and tensioned tightly. This
type of taut, diagonal line can be used in a variety of ways as an operational
rescue tool.
Swift water self-rescue involves all
capabilities discussed in A-7-3.5(j) as well as the capability to swim in
current while defending against obstacles that are likely to be encountered.
A common technique used to safely swim
in moving water is to swim face up with the feet downstream while using the
hands to maneuver (swim). When obstacles such as rocks are encountered the feet
can be used to push off. If strainers are encountered that cannot be
circumnavigated, the swimmer should make every attempt to swim over (never
under or through) them while maneuvering toward a safe shore.
Additional hazards can be found in
A-7-3.5(b).
Boat-assisted operations involve the
actual performance of rescue techniques through the use of one or more boats. [See
also A-7-3.5(n).]
“Go” techniques include, but are not
limited to, the following:
(a) Shallow
water crossing
(b) In-water
contact rescues with or without floating rescue devices, including rescue
tubes, boards, and so forth
(c) Rescuer
combat techniques (i.e., blocks/escapes) when conducting in-water contact
rescues
(d) The
use of specialized PPE (i.e., rescue release personal flotation devices) and
other specialized equipment and techniques utilized by the AHJ
(e) Advanced
rope rescue techniques including the use of high lines
(f) Other
“go” techniques and more advanced options utilized by the AHJ
Examples of specialty training include
dry suit use, full face or light helmet use, underwater communications
equipment, deep diving, night/limited visibility, current, polluted water, team
operations, leadership, lifting equipment, cave/cavern diving, tidal diving,
surface supply diving, ice diving, and underwater tools. Organizations at the
technician level can gain knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to extend
their capabilities at a controlled training situation.
Additional areas that might need to be
addressed include scene surveys, drowning accidents, operational planning,
effective search patterns, electronic equipment (e.g., sonar, underwater
video), safety procedures, handling of outside influences, rescue/recovery
techniques and procedures, incident management system (IMS), critical incident
stress debriefing (CISD), and risk/benefit.
Nationally recognized agencies include,
but are not limited to, the following:
(a) PADI
(Professional Association of Dive Instructors)
(b) SSI
(SCUBA Schools International)
(c) NAUI
(National Association of Underwater Instructors)
(d) YMCA
(Young Men"s Christian Association)
(e) PDIC
(Professional Diving Instructor’s Corporation)
(f) DRI
(Dive Rescue International)
(g) NASDS
(National Association of SCUBA Diving Schools)
(h) MDEA
(Multinational Diving Educators Association)
(i) IDEA
(International Diving Educators Association)
(j) LACUI
(Los Angeles County Underwater Instructors)
Training in skin and SCUBA diving
should include, but not be limited to, the information conveyed in a nationally
recognized skin/SCUBA diving program.
Safe use of dive tables means precise
use of nationally recognized dive tables specified for the type of dive
operation undertaken.
The treatment of dive-related injuries
and maladies is often beyond the capability of standard basic life support
(BLS) providers. Therefore, the AHJ should assure that procedures are in place
during any dive to provide appropriate emergency medical care for the treatment
of dive-related injuries. This can include the training of selected personnel
as dive medics (a specialized emergency medical training program) or
establishing a standard operating procedure (SOP) to address the situation.
Effective underwater communication
refers to the capability to communicate between divers and from a diver to the
surface. Such communications can be achieved through the use of rope signals, a
hard-wired communications system, a wireless communications system, or whatever
system is in use by the organization.
Self-rescue on ice includes, but is not
limited to, the following capabilities:
(a) Roll,
crawl, or swim away from an ice hole
(b) Utilize
any personal ice rescue equipment used by the organization such as ice awls,
crampons, and so forth
(c) Practical
methods of weight distribution
In all types of wilderness rescue
incidents, the potential exists for extenuating circumstances that would
require expertise beyond the normal capability of the organization to safely
operate. Examples of these situations include lowering and raising operations
requiring significant obstacle negotiation, descending or ascending operations
from extreme heights, or severe environmental conditions (e.g., snow, rain,
altitude). These conditions should be evaluated during the initial risk
assessment and on an incident-by-incident basis.
The size-up should include, but not be
limited to, the initial and continuous evaluation of the following:
(a) Scope
and magnitude of the incident including whether it is a search, rescue, or body
recovery
(b) Assessment
of time required
(c) Assessment
of manpower needs
(d) Specific
environmental factors involved
(e) Integrity
and stability of the environment involved
(f) Number
of known/potential victims
(g) Weather
(current and forecast)
(h) Urgency
(based on the type of known/potential victims)
(i) Available/necessary
resources
The emergency response system includes,
but is not limited to, operations- and technician-level personnel, as well as
local, state, and federal resources.
Training should address the process of
achieving and maintaining control of the site and the perimeter. This might
include management of all civilian and nonemergency personnel and establishment
of operational zones and site security.
General hazards associated with search
and rescue operations in the wilderness can present the AHJ with uniquely
challenging situations. The AHJ should consider the following potential hazards
and, in order to help ensure their safety, assure members have the ability to
recognize potential hazards that they can encounter.
(a) Personal
Hazards. In the wilderness environment, there are many dangers that pose
personal injury and physiological hazards to the responders. Personnel should
be made aware of hazards including, but not limited to, blisters, scrapes,
scratches, falls, blows, bruises, dehydration, and so forth.
(b) Environmental
Hazards. Depending on the specific environment, there are many dangers that
pose hazards to the responders. Personnel should be made aware of hazards including,
but not limited to, insect bites and stings, poisonous plants, exposure
injuries (cold and heat), snow blindness, altitude illness, lightning, sunburn,
dangerous wildlife, and so forth.
(c) Terrain
Hazards. Specific features in an environment can pose hazards to
responders. Personnel should be made aware of hazards including, but not
limited to, cliffs, avalanches, standing water (e.g., ponds, lakes), flat ice
(e.g., ponds, lakes), moving water (e.,g., rivers, streams), caves, mines,
wells, high winds, snow (blowing and fallen), coastal white water surf, and so
forth.
(d) Man-Made
Hazards. Humans, whether intentionally or accidentally, can also cause
unsafe conditions in the wilderness. Personnel should be made aware of hazards
including, but not limited to, booby-trapped stills and labs (covert ethanol
and drug production), hazardous materials dumps, trained attack dogs (drug
labs), and so forth.
Conventional emergency response PPE and
equipment (especially fire-related equipment) is often inappropriate for use in
a wilderness setting. For instance, fire helmets and boots can increase one’s
potential for injury in the wilderness.
Conventional emergency response skills
such as using a sphygmomanometer and using an ambulance cot have very little
application in the wilderness. Therefore, such skills and equipment will
require modification to achieve the rescuer’s desired goals in the wilderness.
Documents for the collection and
recording of information can include the following:
(a) Information
regarding the lost person or persons
(b) Information
needed to determine search urgency
(c) Information
required by the AHJ
(d) Information
required by the incident management system (IMS)
(e) Information
required to identify a subject’s track (i.e., footprint)
(f) Information
for development of search strategy
Isolation includes keeping the
reporting party handy for interviewers and isolated from media and the incident
operations, as well as isolated from one another, in the case of multiple
reporting parties.
In some cases, where minimum exposure
to wilderness hazards exists, it can be appropriate for the AHJ to establish
SOPs that permit operations-level personnel to conduct certain rescues without
supervision of technician-level personnel.
Resources can include but are not
limited to the following:
(a) Search
dogs
(b) Trackers
(c) Aircraft
(d) Ground/air
search specialists
(e) Rope
rescue specialists
(f) Water
search and rescue specialists
(g) Trench
rescue specialists
(h) Vehicle/machinery
rescue specialists
(i) Collapsed
building search and/or rescue specialists
(j) Emergency
incident management (overhead) teams
(k) Avalanche
rescue specialists
(l) Cave
rescue specialists
(m) Mine
rescue specialists
(n) Other
technical search and/or rescue providers and managers
The AHJ shall establish wilderness
medical care protocols.
Body management refers to the skills
and knowledge involved in maintaining personal nutrition, hydration, rest, and
other physiological requirements of the human body.
Personal support equipment should
include that which is necessary to address the following needs, or potential needs,
of a rescuer in a wilderness setting:
(a) Personal
medical (first aid) supplies
(b) Additional
clothing appropriate for anticipated environment/weather
(c) Fluids
and food appropriate for mission duration
(d) Personal
safety and comfort gear (e.g., flashlight, sunglasses, sunscreen)
(e) Navigation
(e.g., compass, map)
(f) General
marking and documentation tools (e.g., flagging tape, paper/pencil)
(g) Improvisational
tools (e.g., wire, twine, leaf bag, safety pin)
(h) Emergency
shelter, bivouac, and/or body protection
(i) Emergency
communications (e.g., whistle, radio, flare)
(j) Pack
for contents (e.g., belt pack, ruck sack)
The AHJ should establish procedures for
negotiating and/or avoiding conditions and hazards specific to the wilderness
environments and terrains in which rescuers can become involved. It is likely
that some conditions and/or situations will exceed the capability of the
organization. In such situations, additional, more experienced, specialized, or
highly trained resources should be procured. (See also 8-1.2 and A-8-1.2.)
Skills involved in supporting and
participating in a search should include, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) Hasty,
efficient, and thorough search techniques
(b) Principles
of confinement and segmentation of the search area
(c) Principles
and importance of clue awareness
(d) Basic
search probability theory application and terminology
(e) Principles
of lost person behavior
(f) Procedures
for serving as an air observer (e.g., searching from an aircraft)
(g) Procedures
for handling, processing, and documenting evidence
Skills involved in supporting and
participating in a search should include, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) Hasty,
efficient, and thorough search techniques
(b) Principles
of confinement and segmentation of the search area
(c) Principles
and importance of clue awareness
(d) Basic
search probability theory application and terminology
(e) Principles
of lost person behavior
(f) Procedures
for serving as an air observer (e.g., searching from an aircraft)
(g) Procedures
for handling, processing, and documenting evidence
The ability to discern limitations in
accessing and/or evacuating should be based on the following:
(a) Individual
and team expertise
(b) Qualified
personnel available
(c) Ability
to communicate from the patient scene
(d) Anticipated
manpower and time
Members of an organization at the
technician level should be adept and experienced at every skill required of
subordinate personnel. Technician-level organizations should have the
capability to address any potential operation that falls within their
jurisdiction. To accomplish this, members of these organizations should be
personally adept at wilderness skills, travel, and operations in the wilderness
setting.
Such an operational plan should be
based on the hazard analysis and risk assessment performed according to Section
2-2 of this standard, available resources, environmental influences and
conditions, and the urgency of the situation. Specifically with regard to a
search, the implemented plan should involve proper search management techniques
including, but not necessarily limited to, the following:
(a) Determining
the urgency of the search
(b) Developing
a lost subject profile
(c) Establishing
and segmenting the search area properly
(d) Conducting
an appropriate investigation and interviews
(e) Applying
the concept of search probability theory
(f) Designing,
developing, and establishing appropriate search strategy and tactics
(g) Establishing
and managing appropriate base camp
(h) Briefing
and debriefing of operational personnel properly and thoroughly
(i) Considering
suspension of the search when appropriate
(j) Demobilizing
personnel and facilities
(k) Documenting
the incident properly
In all types of trench and excavation
rescue incidents, the potential exists for extenuating circumstances that would
require expertise beyond the normal capability of the organization to safely
operate. Examples of these situations include, but are not limited to, very
deep trenches, unusually shaped excavations, multiple complications (e.g., deep
excavation and fluid soil), involvement of hazardous/toxic substances,
completely buried subjects, or severe environmental conditions (e.g., snow and
rain). These conditions should be evaluated during the initial risk assessment
and on an incident-by-incident basis.
The size-up should include, but not be
limited to, the initial and continuous evaluation of the following:
(a) Scope,
magnitude, and nature of the incident
(b) Location
and number of victims
(c) Risk
versus benefit analysis (body recovery versus rescue)
(d) Exposure
to traffic and sources of vibration
(e) Hazards
such as disrupted or exposed utilities, standing or flowing water, secondary
collapse, mechanical, hazmat, and explosives
(f) Trench/excavation
dimensions
(g) Access
to the scene
(h) Environmental
factors
(i) Available/necessary
resources
See A-3-2.2(b).
The emergency response system includes,
but is not limited to, operations- and technician-level personnel, as well as
local, state, and federal resources.
These procedures should include the
process of achieving and maintaining control of the site and the perimeter.
This might include management of all civilian and nonemergency personnel and
establishment of operational zones and site security.
General hazards associated with search
and rescue operations at trench and excavation collapses can present the AHJ
with uniquely challenging situations. The AHJ should consider the following
potential hazards when providing training to its members.
(a) Utilities.
Control of the utilities in and around a trench or excavation emergency is
critical to ensure the safety of responding personnel and victims. The AHJ
should provide its members with training in the control of these services in
order to provide a safe environment in which to operate and to ensure the
safety of victims. The following utilities should be considered when providing
training:
1. Electrical services (primary and secondary)
2. Gas, propane, fuel oil, or other alternative energy sources
(primary systems)
3. Water/steam
4. Sanitary systems
5. Communications
6. Secondary service systems (such as compressed, medical, or
industrial gases)
(b) Hazardous
Materials. Excavations might include various materials unique to a site
that, when released during a collapse, could pose a hazard to victims and
responders. The AHJ should provide members with training in the recognition of
potential hazardous material releases, the determination of an existing hazard,
and the methods used to contain, confine, or divert hazardous materials in
order to conduct operations safely and effectively.
(c) Personal
Hazards. At the site of any trench or excavation collapse, there are many
dangers that pose personal injury hazards to the responders. The AHJ should
train members to recognize the personal hazards they encounter and to use the
methods needed to mitigate these hazards in order to help ensure their safety.
Every member should be made aware of hazards such as trips, falls, blows,
punctures, impalement, and so forth.
(d) Confined
Space. All trench and many excavation collapses necessitate a confined
space rescue. Responding personnel should be familiar with and trained in
confined space rescue requirements and techniques. The AHJ should determine the
applicable laws and standards related to confined space rescue and should
provide training to members in confined space rescue.
(e) Other
Hazards. There are numerous other hazards associated with trench and
excavation collapses. The AHJ should make every effort to identify the hazards
that might be encountered within the jurisdiction and should provide members
with training and awareness of these other hazards in order to perform rescue
operations safely and effectively.
The “general area” around a trench or
excavation emergency is the entire area within 300 ft (91.44 m) (or more, as
established by the incident commander). Making the general area safe includes,
but is not necessarily limited to, the following:
(a) Controlling/limiting
traffic and sources of vibration in the area including shutting down all
vehicles and equipment
(b) Controlling/limiting
access to the area by unnecessary personnel
(c) Identifying
hazards and removing and/or reducing their impact
The types of collapse normally
encountered at an excavation or trench incident include the following:
(a) Spoil
pile collapse — where the excavated earth piled on the side of the trench
slides into the trench
(b) Shear
wall collapse — where one side of the trench shears away from the wall of the
trench
(c) Slough
collapse — where a below-grade section collapses, leaving the potential for the
collapse of an overhanging ledge
The reasons and indicators of initial
and secondary collapse of trenches and excavations are usually related to one
or more of the following site characteristics:
(a) Unprotected
trench (lack of protection systems)
(b) Static
loads
(c) Standing
water or water seeping into trench
(d) Intersecting
trenches
(e) Vibrations
(from vehicles, nearby roads, airports, etc.)
(f) Previously
disturbed soil
(g) Exterior
cracking of trench walls
Rapid, nonentry rescues include placing
a ladder to allow a victim to perform a self-rescue or allowing noninjured
persons in the trench to remove a victim.
As a rule of thumb, a cubic foot of
soil weighs 100 pounds and a cubic yard of soil weighs 1.5 tons.
The weight and movement of soil alone
can cause crush injuries, and the characteristics of the soil (e.g., wet, hard,
sandy) will dictate how the soil will entrap (e.g., flow around, drown) a
victim.
Severe environmental conditions include
operations involving frozen soil, running soil (e.g., gravel, sand, liquid),
severe weather (e.g., heavy rain, wind, or flooding), or night (dark)
operations.
Supplemental sheeting and shoring
includes operations that involve the use of commercial sheeting/shoring systems
and/or isolation devices, or cutting and placement of sheeting and shoring when
greater than 2 ft (.61 m) of shoring exists below the bottom of the strongback.
Supplemental sheeting and shoring requires additional training beyond that of
traditional sheeting and shoring. Traditional sheeting and shoring involves the
use of 4 ft 8 ft (1.22 m 2.44 m) sheet panels with a strongback
attachment supplemented by a variety of conventional shoring options such as
hydraulic, pneumatic, and/or screw shores.
Commercial sheeting/shoring systems and
devices include trench boxes, sheet piles, plate steel, and the like. Isolation
devices include concrete pipes, concrete vaults, steel pipe, or anything that
serves to separate the victim(s) from the surrounding soil.
Where the stability of adjoining
buildings, walls, or other structures is endangered by excavation operations,
support systems such as shoring, bracing, or underpinning should be provided to
ensure the stability of such structures for the protection of employees.
Excavation below the level of the base
or footing of any foundation or retaining wall that could be reasonably
expected to pose a hazard to employees should not be permitted except when one
of the following occurs:
(a) A
support system, such as underpinning, is provided to ensure the safety of
employees and the stability of the structure.
(b) The
excavation is in stable rock.
(c) A
registered professional engineer has approved the determination that the
structure is sufficiently removed from the excavation so as to be unaffected by
the excavation activity.
(d) A
registered professional engineer has approved the determination that such
excavation work will not pose a hazard to employees.
Sidewalks, pavements, and appurtenant
structure should not be undermined unless a support system or another method of
protection is provided to protect employees from the possible collapse of such
structures.
Procedures to identify probable victim
locations include the following:
(a) Visualization
of the victim
(b) Presence
of drink cups or food containers, work tools, laser targets, buckets, grade
poles, grease and brush, engineers hubs, or anything that can indicate the
victim’s last probable physical location
(c) Information
from bystanders
(d) End
of pipe string
(e) Sounds
in pipes
(f) “Cat”
or tire tracks
The rescue area is that area
immediately surrounding the trench and/or excavation site. Making the rescue
area safe includes, but is not limited to, the following actions; however
specific actions should be based on both the type of collapse and the soil
type.
(a) Utilizing
sheeting and shoring to stabilize trench/excavation walls
(b) Making
the trench/excavation safe for entry
(c) Safely
undertaking disentanglement operations in the trench/excavation
(d) Placing
ground pads at the lip of the trench/excavation
(e) Ventilating
the trench and monitoring its atmosphere
(f) Dewatering
(g) Supporting
any unbroken utilities
(h) Providing
a helmet and goggles for a victim, if possible
(i) Prohibiting
entry into an unsafe trench/excavation
(j) Preventing
the touching or operating of heavy equipment until its safety has been
established
The term tabulated data usually
refers to the six tables found in Appendix C of 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P.
Traditional sheeting and shoring should
not be used in situations that exceed the tabulated data for timber trench
shoring presented in 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P. Also, these systems should
not be used where they would be submerged in water.
In many parts of the United States, a
one-call underground utility location service is available to contractors and
residents who are preparing to excavate. By making one telephone call (usually
a toll free number), excavators can learn the location of all underground
utility installations in the area of the planned excavation. This service
quickly notifies all possible utility providers in the area who, in turn,
either indicate that there is no utility in the area or have someone go to the
site to mark the utilities. Such a service can be invaluable to emergency
responders at the site of a trench or excavation emergency incident.
Where no one-call system exists, all
utility companies who might have underground equipment at or near the
excavation site must be notified so they can have a representative respond to
mark underground utility locations.
The following is excerpted from 29 CFR
1926.651, “Specific Excavation Requirements,” and specifies soil types.
“Cemented soil” means a soil in which
the particles are held together by a chemical agent, such as calcium carbonate,
such that a hand-size sample cannot be crushed into powder or individual soil
particles by finger pressure.
“Cohesive soil” means clay (fine
grained soil), or soil with a high clay content, which has cohesive strength.
Cohesive soil does not crumble, can be excavated with vertical sideslopes, and
is plastic when moist. Cohesive soil is hard to break up when dry, and exhibits
significant cohesion when submerged. Cohesive soils include clayey silt, sandy
clay, silty clay, clay, and organic clay.
“Dry soil” means soil that does not
exhibit visible signs of moisture content.
“Fissured” means a soil material that
has a tendency to break along definite planes of fracture with little
resistance, or a material that exhibits open cracks, such as tension cracks, in
an exposed surface.
“Granular soil” means gravel, sand, or
silt (coarse grained soil) with little or no clay content. Granular soil has no
cohesive strength. Some moist granular soils exhibit apparent cohesion.
Granular soil cannot be molded when moist and crumbles easily when dry.
“Layered system” means two or more
distinctly different soil or rock types arranged in layers. Micaceous seams or
weakened planes in rock or shale are considered layered.
“Moist soil” means a condition in which
a soil looks and feels damp. Moist cohesive soil can easily be shaped into a
ball and rolled into small diameter threads before crumbling. Moist granular
soil that contains some cohesive material will exhibit signs of cohesion
between particles.
“Plastic” means a property of a soil
that allows the soil to be deformed or molded without cracking or appreciable
volume change.
“Saturated soil” means a soil in which
the voids are filled with water. Saturation does not require flow. Saturation,
or near saturation, is necessary for the proper use of instruments such as a
pocket penetrometer or sheer vane.
“Soil classification system” means, for
the purpose of this subpart, a method of categorizing soil and rock deposits in
a hierarchy of stable rock, Type A, Type B, and Type C, in decreasing order of
stability. The categories are determined based on an analysis of the properties
and performance characteristics of the deposits and the characteristics of the
deposits and the environmental conditions of exposure.
“Stable rock” means natural solid
mineral matter that can be excavated with vertical sides and remain intact
while exposed.
“Submerged soil” means soil that is
underwater or is free-seeping.
“Type A” means cohesive soils with an
unconfined, compressive strength of 1.5 ton per square foot (tsf) (144 kPa) or
greater. Examples of cohesive soils are clay, silty clay, sandy clay, clay
loam, and, in some cases, silty clay loam and sandy clay loam. Cemented soils
such as caliche and hardpan are also considered Type A. However, no soil is
Type A if one of the following conditions exists:
(a) The
soil is fissured.
(b) The
soil is subject to vibration from heavy traffic, pile driving, or similar
effects.
(c) The
soil has been previously disturbed.
(d) The
soil is part of a sloped, layered system where the layers dip into the
excavation on a slope of four horizontal to one vertical (4H:1V) or greater.
(e) The
material is subject to other factors that would require it to be classified as
a less stable material.
“Type B” means one or more of the
following:
(a) Cohesive
soil with an unconfined compressive strength greater than 0.5 tsf (48 kPa) but
less than 1.5 tsf (144 kPa)
(b) Granular
cohesionless soils including angular gravel (similar to crushed rock), silt,
silt loam, sandy loam, and, in some cases, silty clay loam and sandy clay loam
(c) Previously
disturbed soils except those that would otherwise be classed as Type C soil
(d) Soil
that meets the unconfined compressive strength or cementation requirements for
Type A but is fissured or subject to vibration
(e) Dry
rock that is not stable
(f) Material
that is part of a sloped, layered system where the layers dip into the
excavation on a slope less steep than four horizontal to one vertical (4H:1V),
but only if the material would otherwise be classified as Type B
“Type C” means one or more of the
following:
(a) Cohesive
soil with an unconfined compressive strength of 0.5 tsf (48 kPa) or less
(b) Granular
soils including gravel, sand, and loamy sand
(c) Submerged
soil or soil from which water is freely seeping
(d) Submerged
rock that is not stable
(e) Material
in a sloped, layered system where the layers dip into the excavation or a slope
of four horizontal to one vertical (4H:1V) or steeper
“Unconfined compressive strength” means
the load per unit area at which a soil will fail in compression. It can be
determined by laboratory testing or estimated in the field using a pocket
penetrometer, by thumb penetration tests, and other methods.
“Wet soil” means soil that contains
significantly more moisture than moist soil but in such a range of values that
cohesive material will slump or begin to flow when vibrated. Granular material
that would exhibit cohesive properties when moist will lose those cohesive
properties when wet.
The classification of soil should be
made based on the results of at least one visual and at least one manual
analysis. Such analyses should be conducted by a competent person using tests
described in Appendix A (Soil Classification) of 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P,
or in other recognized methods of soil classification and testing such as those
adopted by the American Society for Testing Materials or the U.S. Department of
Agriculture textural classification system.
The visual and manual analyses, such as
those specified in Appendix A (Soil Classification) of 29 CFR 1926,
Subpart P, should be designed and conducted to provide sufficient quantitative
and qualitative information as might be necessary to identify properly the
properties, factors, and conditions affecting the classification of the soil.
A ladder or engineered ramp can be
required for entry or egress from a trench. For instance, 29 CFR
1926.651(c)(1)(v) requires, “A stairway, ladder, ramp or other safe means of
egress shall be located in trench excavations that are 4 feet or more in depth
so as to require no more than 25 feet of lateral travel for employees.”
The pre-entry briefing should include,
but not be limited to, information regarding the following:
(a) Tactical
assignments with explicit instructions
(b) General
hazards and safety instructions
(c) Communications
protocols, procedures, and details
(d) Anticipated
environmental concerns
(e) Time
frames for operations
(f) Emergency
procedures
(g) Specific
equipment needs
(h) Debriefing
procedures
(i) Anticipated
logistical needs
Documentation for entry operations, as
a minimum, should include the following:
(a) Development
of some type of representation of IMS command structure
(b) Time
of incident
(c) Total
time of operation
(d) Environmental
conditions
(e) Location
of victim
(f) Creation
of a tactical checklist that includes entry times, exit times, personal
accountability reports, atmospheric readings, rehabilitation information,
injuries sustained, and incident number
Rapid intervention team (RIT) members
should be at or above the capability level at which the incident is operating.
The following describes and defines
sloping and benching as used in this standard and is excerpted from Appendix B
(Excavations, Sloping and Benching) of 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P.
(a) Scope
and application. This appendix contains specifications for sloping and benching
when used as methods of protecting employees working in excavations from
cave-ins. The requirements of this appendix apply when the design of sloping
and benching protective systems is to be performed in accordance with the
requirements set forth in 1926.652(b)(2).
(b) Definitions.
“Actual slope” means the slope to
which an excavation face is excavated.
“Distress” means that the soil is
in a condition where a cave-in is imminent or is likely to occur. Distress is
evidenced by such phenomena as the development of fissures in the face of or
adjacent to an open excavation; the subsidence of the edge of an excavation; the
slumping of material from the face or the bulging or heaving of material from
the bottom of an excavation; the spalling of material from the face of an
excavation; and ravelling, e.g., small amounts of material such as pebbles or
little clumps of material suddenly separating from the face of an excavation
and trickling or rolling down into the excavation.
“Maximum allowable slope” means the
steepest incline of an excavation face that is acceptable for the most
favorable site conditions as protection against cave-ins, and is expressed as
the ratio of horizontal distance to vertical rise (H:V).
“Short term exposure” means a
period of time less than or equal to 24 hours that an excavation is open.
(c) Requirements.
1. Soil classification. Soil and rock deposits shall be classified
in accordance with appendix A to subpart P of part 1926.
2. Maximum allowable slope. The maximum allowable slope for a soil
or rock deposit shall be determined from Table [A-9-3.3(o)] of this appendix.
3. Actual slope.
i. The actual slope shall not be steeper than the maximum
allowable slope.
ii. The actual slope shall be less steep than the maximum allowable
slope, when there are signs of distress. If that situation occurs, the slope
shall be cut back to an actual slope which is at least 1/2
horizontal to one vertical (1/2
H:1V) less steep than the maximum allowable slope.
iii. When surcharge loads from stored material or equipment,
operating equipment, or traffic are present, a competent person shall determine
the degree to which the actual slope must be reduced below the maximum
allowable slope, and shall assure that such reduction is achieved. Surcharge
loads from adjacent structures shall be evaluated in accordance with
1926.651(i).
4. Configurations. Configurations of sloping and benching systems
shall be in accordance with Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(1)].
Table [A-9-3.3(o)] Maximum Allowable Slopes
|
Soil or rock type |
Maximum allowable slopes
(H:V)(1) for excavations less than 20 feet deep (3) |
|
Stable rock |
Vertical (90 Deg.) |
|
Type A (2) |
3/4:1 (53 Deg.) |
|
Type B |
1:1 (45 Deg.) |
|
Type C |
1 1/2:1
(34 Deg.) |
|
Footnote(1) Numbers shown in
parentheses next to maximum allowable slopes are angles expressed in degrees
from the horizontal. Angles have been rounded off. Footnote(2) A short-term
maximum allowable slope of 1/2H:1V
(63 degrees) is allowed in excavations in Type A soil that are 12 feet (3.67
m) or less in depth. Short-term maximum allowable slopes for excavations
greater than 12 feet (3.67 m) in depth shall be 3/4H:1V
(53 degrees). Footnote(3) Sloping or
benching for excavations greater than 20 feet deep shall be designed by a
registered professional engineer. Source: 29 CFR 1926,
Subpart P, Appendix B, Table B-1. |
|
B-1.1 Excavations Made in Type A Soil 1.
All simple slope excavation 20 feet or
less in depth shall have a maximum allowable slope of 3/4:1.
(See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(1)])
SIMPLE SLOPE — GENERAL Exception:
Simple slope excavations which are open 24 hours or less (short term) and which
are 12 feet or less in depth shall have a maximum allowable slope of 1/2:1.
(See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(2)])
SIMPLE SLOPE — SHORT TERM 2. All
benched excavations 20 feet or less in depth shall have a maximum allowable
slope of 3/4 to 1 and maximum bench dimensions as follows: (See Figure
[A-9-3.3(o)(3)])
SIMPLE BENCH; MULTIPLE BENCH 3. All
excavations 8 feet or less in depth which have unsupported vertically sided
lower portions shall have a maximum vertical side of 31/2
feet. (See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(4)])
UNSUPPORTED VERTICALLY SIDED LOWER
PORTION — MAXIMUM 8 FEET IN DEPTH All excavations more than 8 feet but not more
than 12 feet in depth with unsupported vertically sided lower portions shall
have a maximum allowable slope of 1:1 and a maximum vertical side of 31/2
feet. (See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(5)])
UNSUPPORTED VERTICALLY SIDED LOWER
PORTION — MAXIMUM 12 FEET IN DEPTH All excavations 20 feet or less in depth
which have vertically sided lower portions that are supported or shielded shall
have a maximum allowable slope of 3/4:1.
The support or shield system must extend at least 18 inches above the top of
the vertical side. (See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(6)])
SUPPORTED OR SHIELDED VERTICALLY SIDED
LOWER PORTION 4. All other simple slope, compound slope, and vertically sided
lower portion excavations shall be in accordance with the other options
permitted under 1926.652(b). (See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(7)])
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(1) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1-1a)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(2) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.1b)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(3) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.1c)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(4) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.1d)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(5) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.1e)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(6) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.1f)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(7) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.1g)
B-1.2 Excavations Made in Type B Soil 1.
All simple slope excavations 20 feet or
less in depth shall have a maximum allowable slope of 1:1. (See Figure
[A-9-3.3(o)(8)])
SIMPLE SLOPE 2. All benched excavations
20 feet or less in depth shall have a maximum allowable slope of 1:1 and
maximum bench dimensions as follows: (See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(9)])
SINGLE BENCH AND MULTIPLE BENCH (These
benches allowed in cohesive soil only). 3. All excavations 20 feet or less in
depth which have vertically sided lower portions shall be shielded or supported
to a height at least 18 inches above the top of the vertical side. All such
excavations shall have a maximum allowable slope of 1:1. (See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(10)])
VERTICALLY SIDED LOWER PORTION 4. All
other sloped excavations shall be in accordance with the other options
permitted in 1926.652(b). (See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(11)])
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(8) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.2a)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(9) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.2b)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(10) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.2c)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(11) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.2d)
B-1.3 Excavations Made in Type C Soil 1.
All simple slope excavations 20 feet or
less in depth shall have a maximum allowable slope of 11/2:1.
(See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(12)])
SIMPLE SLOPE 2. All excavations 20 feet
or less in depth which have vertically sided lower portions shall be shielded
or supported to a height at least 18 inches above the top of the vertical side.
All such excavations shall have a maximum allowable slope of 11/2:1.
(See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(13)])
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(12) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.3a)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(13) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.3b)
VERTICAL SIDED LOWER PORTION 3. All
other sloped excavations shall be in accordance with the other options
permitted in 1926.652(b).
B-1.4 Excavations Made in Layered Soils 1.
All excavations 20 feet or less in
depth made in layered soils shall have a maximum allowable slope for each layer
as set forth below. (See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(14)])
B OVER A (See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(15)])
C OVER A (See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(16)])
C OVER B (See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(17)])
A OVER B (See Figure [A-9-3.3(o)(18)])
A OVER C (See Figure [A-9.3.3(o)(19)])
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(14) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.4a)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(15) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.4b)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(16) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.4c)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(17) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.4d)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(18) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.4e)
Figure A-9-3.3(o)(19) (Source: 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, Figure B-1.4f)
B OVER C 2. All other sloped
excavations shall be in accordance with the other options permitted in
1926.652(b).
Procedures for disentanglement and
removing the entrapment mechanism can include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(a) Hand
digging
(b) Lifting
using air bags, pneumatic, or other mechanical advantage devices
(c) Suctioning
(d) Cutting
using air knives, saws, or other power tools
(e) Dewatering
(f) Heavy
equipment
Procedures and equipment involved in
removal systems should comply with NFPA 1983, Standard on Fire Service Life
Safety Rope and System Components.
Heavy or mechanical equipment and/or
mechanical winches of any kind should not be used to physically lift, pull, or
extricate victims from a trench. However, there can be circumstances when heavy
equipment can be appropriate for accessing victims of trench and evacuation
emergencies with the appropriate level of supervision and after careful
consideration is given to the negative impact of such actions on the victim,
including the effects of extreme superimposed loads and vibration adjacent to
the trench. For example, heavy equipment might be used to dig an adjacent
trench or hole for access, but the excessive loading and vibration of the area
adjacent to the trench can cause a rapid deterioration in the condition of, and
in the immediate environment surrounding, the victim. In any case, to best
establish viable options and available capabilities, the advice of experienced
and knowledgeable on-site personnel should be sought in order to make the best
possible decisions.
See A-9-3.1.
Manufactured protection systems include
trench boxes, rabbit boxes, “coffins,” rigging and placement of sheetpiles,
rigging and placement of plate steel, or other similar commercial systems. [See
also 9-3.3(d).]
Personnel meeting the requirements of
NFPA 472, Standard for Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous
Materials Incidents, should perform the monitoring procedures even if such
personnel are not part of the rescue team. Important information regarding
these procedures include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) Acceptable
limits for oxygen concentration in air should be between 19.5 percent and 23.5
percent. An oxygen-enriched atmosphere is considered to be greater than 23.5
percent and poses a flammability hazard. An oxygen-deficient atmosphere is
considered to be lower than 19.5 percent and can lead to asphyxiation without
fresh-air breathing apparatus.
(b) Flammability
is measured as a percentage of a material’s lower explosive limit (LEL) or
lower flammable limit (LFL). Rescuers should not enter confined spaces
containing atmospheres greater than 10 percent of a material’s LEL regardless
of the personal protective equipment worn. There is no adequate protection for
an explosion within a confined space.
(c) Acceptable
toxicity levels are specific to the hazardous material involved, and chemical
properties should be assessed to determine the level of the hazard for a given
environment and time frame.
In certain soil and environmental
conditions, it can be necessary to isolate the victim in order to effectively
disentangle him or her. For instance, in sand, grain, pea gravel, coal slag, or
any type of running product, it can be necessary to physically isolate the
victim from the surrounding product in order to free him or her. Examples of
isolation devices include concrete or steel pipe, corrugated pipe, concrete
vaults, or other pre-engineered structures that sufficiently isolate and
protect the victim.
This appendix is not a part of
the requirements of this NFP A document but is included for informational
purposes only.
The material in Table B-1 and Figures
B-1 through B-14 can be used to clarify material found in the body of the
document. Appendix B is extracted from FEMA Earthquake Hazards Reduction Series
41, Rapid Visual Screening of Buildings for Potential Seismic Hazards: A
Handbook.
Table B-1 Combinations of Materials in Structural Types (after ATC, 1987)
|
Structural Type Identifier |
General Description |
|
W |
Wood buildings of all types |
|
S1 |
Steel moment-resisting frames |
|
S2 |
Braced steel frames |
|
S3 |
Light metal buildings |
|
S4 |
Steel frames with cast-in-place concrete shearwalls |
|
C1 |
Concrete moment-resisting frames |
|
C2 |
Concrete shearwall buildings |
|
C3/C5 |
Concrete or steel frame buildings with unreinforced
masonry in-fill walls |
|
TU |
Tilt-up buildings |
|
PC2 |
Precast concrete frame buildings |
|
RM |
Reinforced masonry |
|
URM |
Unreinforced masonry |
Figure B-1 Light metal buildings (S3).
Figure B-2 Post-tensioned lift slab building.
Figure B-3 Wood stud frame construction.
Figure B-4 Steel moment-resisting frame.
Figure B-5 Light metal construction.
Figure B-6 Steel frame with shearwall.
Figure B-7 Steel frame with unreinforced masonry (URM) in-fill.
Figure B-8 Concrete moment-resisting frame.
Figure B-9 Concrete shearwall.
Figure B-10 Tilt-up construction typical of the western United States. Tilt-up construction in the eastern United States can incorporate a steel frame.
Figure B-11 Precast concrete frame.
Figure B-12 Unreinforced masonry bearing wall.
Figure B-13 Unreinforced masonry bearing wall.
Figure B-14 Unreinforced masonry bearing wall.
The following documents or portions
thereof are referenced within this standard for informational purposes only and
are thus not considered part of the requirements of this standard unless also
listed in Chapter 10. The edition indicated here for each reference is the
current edition as of the date of the NFPA issuance of this standard.
National Fire Protection Association, 1
Batterymarch Park, P.O. Box 9101, Quincy, MA 02269-9101.
NFPA 220, Standard on Types of
Building Construction, 1995 edition.
NFPA 471, Recommended Practice for
Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents, 1997 edition.
NFPA 472, Standard for Professional
Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents, 1997 edition.
NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire
Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, 1997 edition.
NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire
Department Incident Management System, 1995 edition.
NFPA 1581, Standard on Fire
Department Infection Control Program, 1995 edition.
NFPA 1982, Standard on Personal
Alert Safety Systems (PASS), 1998
edition.
NFPA 1983, Standard on Fire Service
Life Safety Rope and System Components, 1995 edition.
Building Officials and Code
Administrators International, 4051 W. Flossmoor Road, Country Club Hills, IL
60477.
National Building Code, 1996.
Federal Emergency Management Agency,
500 C Street, SW, Washington, DC 20472.
FEMA Earthquake Hazards Reduction
Series 41, Rapid Visual Screening of Buildings for Potential Seismic
Hazards: A Handbook.
FEMA US&R Response System.
International Conference of Building
Officials, 5360 S. Workman Mill Road, Whittier, CA 90601.
Uniform Building Code, 1997.
Southern Building Code Congress
International, 900 Montclair Road, Birmingham, AL 35213.
Standard Building Code, 1997.
C-1.2.5 U.S. Government Publications.
Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
Title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 1910.120, U.S. Federal OSHA Standard on Hazardous
Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER).
Title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 1910.146, “Permit-Required Confined Spaces,” May 19,
1994.
Title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 1910.1030 (OSHA), “Blood-Borne Pathogens,” July 1, 1992.
Title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 1926, Subpart P, Appendix A, “Soil Classification,” July
1, 1995.
Title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 1926, Subpart P, Appendix C, July 1, 1995.
Title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 1926, Subpart P, Appendix B, “Excavations, Sloping and
Benching,” August 9, 1994.
Title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 1926.651, “Specific Excavation Requirements,” August 9,
1994.
This appendix is not a part of
the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational
purposes only.
The following list provides additional
sources for information on the operations and training of technical rescue
incidents.
ADC, Consensus Standards for
Commercial Diving Operations, Third Edition, American National Standards
Institute, 1991.
Auerbach, Paul S., Editor, Wilderness
Medicine: Management of Wilderness and Environmental Emergencies, Third
Edition, Mosby-Year Book, Inc., 1995.
Barsky, Steven M., Diving in High
Risk Environments, Second Edition, Dive Rescue International, Inc., 1993.
Bechel, Les and Ray, Slim, River
Rescue, Second Edition, Appalachian Mountain Books, Boston, 1989.
CMC Rescue, Inc., Confined Space
Entry and Rescue: A Training Manual, 1996.
Cooper, Donald C., La Valla, Patrick,
and Stoffel, Robert, Search and Rescue Fundamentals: Basic Skills and
Knowledge to Perform Search and Rescue, Third Edition Revised, Emergency
Response Institute, Inc. and National Rescue Consultants, Olympia, WA, 1997.
Downey, Ray, The Rescue Company,
Fire Engineering, Saddle Brook, NJ, 1992.
Drabek, Thomas E., The Professional
Emergency Manager, University of Colorado, Institute of Behavioral Science,
1987.
Drabek, Thomas E., et al, Managing
Multiorganizational Emergency Responses: Emergency Search and Rescue Networks
in Natural Disaster and Remote Area Settings, University of Colorado,
Institute of Behavioral Science, 1981.
Dunn, Vincent, Collapse of Burning
Buildings, A Guide to Fireground Safety, Fire Engineering, New York, 1988.
Dunn, Vincent, Safety and Survival
on the Fireground, Fire Engineering, Saddle Brook, NJ, 1992.
Fasulo, David J., Self Rescue,
Chockstone Press, Evergreen, CO, 1996.
FEMA, New Techniques in Vehicle
Extrication, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emmitsburg, MD,
September, 1994.
FEMA, Urban Search and Rescue
Response System—Operational System Description and Mission Operational
Procedures, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emmitsburg, MD.
Field, Ernest, K., Editor, Mountain
Search And Rescue Operations, Grand Teton Natural History Association, Moose,
WY, 1969.
Frank, James A., Rope Rescue Manual,
CMC Rescue, Inc., Third Edition, 1998.
Frank, James A., and Patterson, Donald
E., Rappel Manual, Second Edition, CMC Rescue, Inc., Santa Barbara, CA,
1997.
Gargan, James B., Trench Rescue,
Mosby Lifeline, Second Edition, 1996.
Goodson, Carl, Editor, Fire Service
Rescue, Sixth Edition, International Fire Service Training Association
(IFSTA), Fire Protection Publications, Stillwater, OK, 1996.
Hill, Kenneth, Editor, Managing the
Lost Person Incident, National Association for Search and Rescue, Fairfax,
VA, 1997.
Hudson, Steve, Editor, Manual Of
U.S. Cave Rescue Techniques, Second Edition, National Speleological
Society, Huntsville, AL, 1988.
LaValla, P., Stoffel, R., and Jones,
A.S.G., Search is an Emergency: A Text for Managing Search Operations,
Fourth Edition Revised, Emergency Response Institute, Olympia, WA, 1996.
Linton, S. J., Rust, D. A., and
Gilliam, T. D., Diver Rescue Specialist Training Manual, Dive Rescue
Inc./International, Fort Collins, CO, 1986.
Lipke, Rick, Technical Rescue
Riggers Guide, Conterra Technical Systems Inc., Bellingham, WA, 1997.
Long, John, Climbing Anchors,
Chockstone Press, Evergreen, CO, 1993.
Long, John and Gaines, Bob, More
Climbing Anchors, Chockstone Press, Evergreen, CO, 1996.
Lonsdale, Mark V., SRT Diver,
Los Angeles, 1989.
March, Bill, Modern Rope Techniques
In Mountaineering, Cicerone Press, Milnthorpe, Cumbria, England, 1976.
NFPA, Comprehensive Glossary of
Terms, Version 2.0, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 1997.
Norman, John, Fire Officer’s
Handbook of Tactics, Fire Engineering, Saddle Brook, NJ, 1991.
Nudell, Mayer and Antokol, Norman, The
Handbook for Effective Emergency and Crisis Management, Lexington Books,
Lexington, MA, 1988.
Ohio Department of Natural Resources,
Division of Watercraft, River Rescue, Instructional Materials
Laboratory, Ohio State University, 1980.
Padgett, Allen and Smith, Bruce, On
Rope, Second Edition, National Speleological Society, Huntsville, AL, 1998.
Ray, Slim, Swiftwater Rescue,
CFS Press, Asheville, NC, 1997.
Rekus, John F., Complete Confined
Spaces Handbook, Lewis Publishers.
Revised Instructional Standards
Minimum Course Content for Entry Level SCUBA Certification, September 1986.
Roco Corporation, Compliance
Guidelines for Confined Space Rescue.
Roop, M., Wright, R., and Vines, T., Confined
Space and Structural Rescue, Mosby, 1998.
Taylor, A. and Cooper, D. C., Fundamentals
of Mantracking: The Step-By-Step Method, Second Edition, Emergency Response
Institute, Olympia, WA, 1995.
Thrun, Robert, Prusiking,
National Speleological Society, Huntsville, AL, 1973.
United States Fire Administration, Protective
Clothing and Equipment Needs of Emergency Responders for Urban Search and
Rescue, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emmitsburg, MD, 1994.
United States Fire Administration, Technical
Rescue Program Development Manual, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
Emmitsburg, MD, August, 1995.
United States Fire Administration, Technical
Rescue Technology Assessment, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
Emmitsburg, MD, January 1995.
United States Lifesaving Association, Guidelines
for Training & Standards of Aquatic Rescue Response Teams, 1996.
U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA
Diving Manual, October 1991.
U.S. Navy, U.S. Navy Diving Manual,
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command and Best Publishing Co., 1993.
Vines, Tom and Hudson, Steve, High
Angle Rescue Techniques: A Student Guide for Rope Rescue Classes, National
Association for Search and Rescue, Fairfax, VA, 1989.
Wheelock, Walt, Ropes, Knots And
Slings For Climbers, La Siesta Press, Glendale, CA, 1967.
Wieder, Michael A., Editor, Principles
of Extrication, First Edition, International Fire Service Training
Association (IFSTA), Fire Protection Publications, Stillwater, OK, 1990.
Worsing, Robert A., Jr., MD, Basic Rescue And Emergency Care, American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, Park Ridge, IL, 1990.